Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
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The binding theory 81<br />
marker x in the domain of the quantifier, as shown in (81b), which is<br />
equivalent to (81c). The second presupposition cannot be bound <strong>and</strong> must<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e be accommodated. Accommodation in the principal DRS is not<br />
possible because this presupposition contains a reference marker, i.e. x,<br />
which is introduced in the domain of the quantifier, <strong>and</strong> so the binding theory<br />
predicts that accommodation in the restrictor is the next-preferred option,<br />
<strong>and</strong> we obtain the DRS in (81d). The reading thus obtained is roughly (but<br />
only roughly, as we will presently see) paraphrased by (82):<br />
(82) Everyone of my friends who owned a copy of 'Lolita' sold it.<br />
I think this is a gratifying result, but it has been argued by Beaver (1994) that<br />
this prediction is false. Beaver's objection is based upon the supposition that,<br />
according to the binding theory, there is no relevant difference at all between<br />
(80) <strong>and</strong> (82). If this were so, then the following contrast would become a<br />
problem:<br />
(83) a. Hardly any of my friends ever owned a copy of 'Lolita', <strong>and</strong><br />
everyone of my friends has sold his copy of 'Lolita'.<br />
b. Hardly any of my friends ever owned a copy of 'Lolita', <strong>and</strong><br />
everyone of my friends who owned a copy of 'Lolita' sold it.<br />
Whereas (83b) is a fairly normal thing to say, (83a) sounds decidedly odd.<br />
However, the binding theory predicts, according to Beaver, that (80) <strong>and</strong><br />
(82) are equivalent, so it cannot account <strong>for</strong> the contrast observed in (83).<br />
More generally, Beaver charges, the prediction that a presuppositional<br />
expression in the scope of a quantifier can give rise to domain restriction is<br />
incorrect.<br />
It is not hard to see what is wrong with Beaver's objection. There is an<br />
obvious difference between (80) <strong>and</strong> (82), which happens to be of a<br />
presuppositional nature. In (80) the quantified subject NP triggers the<br />
presupposition that a set of friends is given. The corresponding<br />
presupposition triggered in (82) is more specific: it presents as given a set of<br />
friends who own a copy of 'Lolita'. If the binding theory had predicted that<br />
the same presuppositions are triggered in (80) <strong>and</strong> (82), Beaver would have<br />
had a point. But since it doesn't, he hasn't.<br />
This suffices to refute Beaver's objection, but of course there is more to say<br />
about the difference between (80) <strong>and</strong> (82), <strong>and</strong> how this difference causes<br />
the contrast in acceptability between (83a) <strong>and</strong> (83b). We must somehow<br />
account <strong>for</strong> the fact that (80) <strong>and</strong> (82) have different presuppositions, <strong>and</strong><br />
the problem with Kamp <strong>and</strong> Reyle's version of DRT is that it doesn't provide<br />
the means <strong>for</strong> doing this in a straight<strong>for</strong>ward way. The presupposition<br />
triggered by the quantifier in (80) may be paraphrased as 'the speaker's<br />
friends'. It may be thought of as the set of individuals which satisfy the