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Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

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The binding theory 81<br />

marker x in the domain of the quantifier, as shown in (81b), which is<br />

equivalent to (81c). The second presupposition cannot be bound <strong>and</strong> must<br />

there<strong>for</strong>e be accommodated. Accommodation in the principal DRS is not<br />

possible because this presupposition contains a reference marker, i.e. x,<br />

which is introduced in the domain of the quantifier, <strong>and</strong> so the binding theory<br />

predicts that accommodation in the restrictor is the next-preferred option,<br />

<strong>and</strong> we obtain the DRS in (81d). The reading thus obtained is roughly (but<br />

only roughly, as we will presently see) paraphrased by (82):<br />

(82) Everyone of my friends who owned a copy of 'Lolita' sold it.<br />

I think this is a gratifying result, but it has been argued by Beaver (1994) that<br />

this prediction is false. Beaver's objection is based upon the supposition that,<br />

according to the binding theory, there is no relevant difference at all between<br />

(80) <strong>and</strong> (82). If this were so, then the following contrast would become a<br />

problem:<br />

(83) a. Hardly any of my friends ever owned a copy of 'Lolita', <strong>and</strong><br />

everyone of my friends has sold his copy of 'Lolita'.<br />

b. Hardly any of my friends ever owned a copy of 'Lolita', <strong>and</strong><br />

everyone of my friends who owned a copy of 'Lolita' sold it.<br />

Whereas (83b) is a fairly normal thing to say, (83a) sounds decidedly odd.<br />

However, the binding theory predicts, according to Beaver, that (80) <strong>and</strong><br />

(82) are equivalent, so it cannot account <strong>for</strong> the contrast observed in (83).<br />

More generally, Beaver charges, the prediction that a presuppositional<br />

expression in the scope of a quantifier can give rise to domain restriction is<br />

incorrect.<br />

It is not hard to see what is wrong with Beaver's objection. There is an<br />

obvious difference between (80) <strong>and</strong> (82), which happens to be of a<br />

presuppositional nature. In (80) the quantified subject NP triggers the<br />

presupposition that a set of friends is given. The corresponding<br />

presupposition triggered in (82) is more specific: it presents as given a set of<br />

friends who own a copy of 'Lolita'. If the binding theory had predicted that<br />

the same presuppositions are triggered in (80) <strong>and</strong> (82), Beaver would have<br />

had a point. But since it doesn't, he hasn't.<br />

This suffices to refute Beaver's objection, but of course there is more to say<br />

about the difference between (80) <strong>and</strong> (82), <strong>and</strong> how this difference causes<br />

the contrast in acceptability between (83a) <strong>and</strong> (83b). We must somehow<br />

account <strong>for</strong> the fact that (80) <strong>and</strong> (82) have different presuppositions, <strong>and</strong><br />

the problem with Kamp <strong>and</strong> Reyle's version of DRT is that it doesn't provide<br />

the means <strong>for</strong> doing this in a straight<strong>for</strong>ward way. The presupposition<br />

triggered by the quantifier in (80) may be paraphrased as 'the speaker's<br />

friends'. It may be thought of as the set of individuals which satisfy the

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