Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
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20 <strong>Presuppositions</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Pronouns</strong><br />
the main goal of this section is not to argue against any particular theory,<br />
but to delineate presuppositions from implicatures, <strong>and</strong> one way of doing<br />
this is by showing that there is no such thing as a projection problem <strong>for</strong><br />
implicatures. ll 11<br />
<strong>Presuppositions</strong> are triggered by certain lexical items <strong>and</strong> grammatical<br />
constructions, <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e it makes sense to say that presuppositions may<br />
be induced in embedded positions. Conversational implicatures, in contrast,<br />
are licensed by utterances in certain contexts, <strong>and</strong> are not, or at least not<br />
necessarily, tied up with specific linguistic <strong>for</strong>ms. There<strong>for</strong>e, it is a category<br />
mistake to speak of conversational implicatures as arising in embedded<br />
positions. 12 To bring home this point, let us compare the following<br />
examples:<br />
(38) a. Fred kissed some of the girls.<br />
b. It is not the case that Fred kissed all the girls.<br />
(39) a. Wilma believes that Fred kissed some of the girls.<br />
b. It is not the case that Wilma believes that Fred kissed all the<br />
girls.<br />
The definite NP the girls triggers the presupposition that there were girls,<br />
<strong>and</strong> sure enough both (38a) <strong>and</strong> (39a) inherit this presupposition, <strong>for</strong><br />
normally speaking either one of these statements would be taken to imply<br />
that a group of girls is contextually given. At the same time, these sentences<br />
seem to somehow imply the falsity of (38b) <strong>and</strong> (39b), respectively.13 These<br />
inferences may be construed as conversational implicatures, along the<br />
following lines. It is plausible to suppose that the truth conditions associated<br />
with some are such that (38a) is strictly speaking true even in a situation<br />
where all the girls were kissed by Fred. An utterance of (38a) in such a<br />
situation might be misleading but it would not be false. Nonetheless, the<br />
11 11 Sadock (1978) <strong>and</strong> Karttunen <strong>and</strong> Peters (1979) have proposed that (some) presuppositions<br />
are really conventional implicatures, but, as Levinson (1983: 217) observes, since the concept of<br />
conventional implicature is such as troubled one, this is just a terminological sidestep, <strong>and</strong> I will<br />
not consider it further. In general, when I speak of 'implicatures' tout court, I will mean<br />
conversational implicatures.<br />
12 12 It might be argued that only generalized conversational implicatures show projection<br />
behaviour (cf. Levinson 1997). Since, according to Grice (1975), a generalized conversational<br />
implicature is associated with 'a certain <strong>for</strong>m of words' (which I take to imply that it is a<br />
conventionalized conversational implicature), it would at least be conceptually coherent to<br />
claim that implicatures can be triggered in embedded positions. But otherwise this position<br />
suffers from the same problems that I will discuss in the following.<br />
13 13 In the case of (39a) it is tempting to infer that Wilma believes that Fred didn't kiss all the girls,<br />
which is stronger than (39b). But this inference can be left out of account here.