mass-communication-theory

108 Section 2 The Era of Mass Society and Mass Culture
business practices. The consumer marketplace benefited from regulation, so why
not regulate the marketplace of ideas? Since 1930, media critics have asked this
question more and more frequently, and the recent rampant concentration of media
companies and rapid diffusion of digital technologies have added new urgency to
the call for government intervention.
Even so, marketplace-of-ideas theory enjoys significant support within the media
industries. That support resides in the “duality” inherent in the marketplace-of-ideas
philosophy, one that “has allowed widely divergent interpretations of the metaphor
to develop” (Napoli, 1999, p. 151). Media policy researcher Philip Napoli identified
two interpretations of the marketplace of ideas. He wrote:
Economic theory-based interpretations of the marketplace of ideas emphasize efficiency,
consumer satisfaction, and competition. Whereas democratic theory-based interpretations
emphasize citizen knowledge, informed decision making, and effective selfgovernment.
Within discussions of the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor, economic
theory-based interpretations typically have been associated with arguments against government
regulation of the communications industry, whereas democratic theory-based
interpretations typically have been associated with calls for such regulation. (Napoli,
1999, pp. 151–152)
Media practitioners are satisfied with this distinction because, as numerous researchers
have demonstrated (e.g., Lavey, 1993; Simon, Atwater, and Alexander,
1988), government—especially agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission
and the Federal Trade Commission, which regulates advertising—“historically
has devoted much greater empirical attention to the economic effects of its
policies than to the social and political effects” (Napoli, 1999, p. 165).
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF MEDIA
During the 1920s and 1930s, a new normative theory of mass communication began
to emerge that rejected both radical Libertarianism and technocratic control.
One source of this theory was congressional hearings over government regulation
of radio. In 1927, these debates led to the establishment of the Federal Radio Commission,
which was the forerunner of the Federal Communications Commission. As
the debates raged, some people—especially Progressive and Populist politicians—
argued that the excesses of yellow journalism proved that self-regulation wasn’t enough.
Overdramatized and fictitious news was so profitable that publishers and
broadcasters couldn’t resist producing it. Without some sort of regulation, radio
was not likely to serve the public interest as well as it should. Even so, Progressives
were cautious about turning control of radio over to government technocrats.
A compromise solution was needed.
By the 1920s, the American public had come to accept government regulation
of public utilities as a means of ending wasteful competition while preserving private
enterprise. Before government regulation of power and telephone companies,
cities were blanketed with competing networks of wires. Anyone who wanted to
talk to people on other networks had to buy phones from all the competing companies.
The cost of building entirely independent networks increased the cost of
phone service and electricity. The solution to these problems was to allow one
Copyright 2010 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. Due to electronic rights, some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s).
Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.