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162 Section 3 From Limited-Effects to Critical Cultural Theories: Ferment in the Field<br />

issues. For example, Americans needed to know what to do in the event of a<br />

nuclear attack. They also needed to know what their leaders were doing to deal<br />

with threats from abroad. Classic theories of democracy assume that the public<br />

must be well informed so that people can make good political decisions. As such,<br />

the flow of information from elites to the public was essential if the United States<br />

was to counter the Communist threat.<br />

Persuasion research had identified numerous barriers to persuasion. News-flow<br />

research focused on determining whether similar barriers impeded the flow of information<br />

from media to typical audience members. It gathered generalizations derived<br />

from laboratory-based attitude-change research and assessed their usefulness in<br />

understanding real-world situations and problems. Some of the barriers investigated<br />

included level of education, amount of media use for news, interest in news, and<br />

talking about news with others. The researchers differentiated between “hard” and<br />

“soft” news. Hard news typically included news about politics, science, world<br />

events, and community organizations. Soft news included sports coverage, gossip<br />

about popular entertainers, and human-interest stories about average people.<br />

News-flow research found that most U.S. citizens learned very little about hard<br />

news because they were poorly educated, made little use of media for hard news,<br />

had low interest in it, and didn’t talk to other people about it (Davis, 1990). Except<br />

for major news events such as President Eisenhower’s heart attack or the assassination<br />

of President John F. Kennedy, most people didn’t know or care much about<br />

national news events. Soft news generally was more likely to be learned than hard<br />

news, but even the flow of soft news was not what might have been hoped. The<br />

most important factor accelerating or reinforcing the flow of news was the degree<br />

to which people talked about individual news items with others. News of the<br />

Kennedy assassination reached most people very rapidly because people interrupted<br />

their daily routine to tell others about it (Greenberg and Parker, 1965). Think back<br />

to how you first heard about the events of 9/11. Did you hear or see a media report<br />

or did someone else talk to you about them? Without talk, learning about most hard<br />

news events rarely reached more than 10 to 20 percent of the population and was<br />

forgotten by those people within a few days or weeks.<br />

Studies of the flow of civil defense information identified similar barriers. In<br />

most cases, members of the public were even less interested in mundane civil<br />

defense information than they were in politics. In a series of field experiments<br />

(DeFleur and Larsen, 1958), researchers dropped hundreds of thousands of leaflets<br />

on small isolated towns in the state of Washington. They signaled their view of the<br />

importance of their research by titling it “Project Revere”—like Paul Revere, they<br />

were seeking ways to inform the nation about an impending attack. DeFleur and<br />

Larsen wanted to determine how effective leaflets would be in warning people<br />

about incoming Soviet bombers. For example, one set of leaflets announced that a<br />

civil defense test was being conducted. Every person who found a leaflet was<br />

instructed to tell someone else about it and then drop the leaflet in a mailbox.<br />

The researchers were disappointed that relatively few folks read or returned the<br />

leaflets. Children were the most likely to take them seriously. To get the most useful<br />

effect, eight leaflets had to be dropped for every resident in town. Speculating<br />

that people were ignoring the leaflets because they only warned of a hypothetical<br />

attack, and threatening people with a real attack was considered too problematic,<br />

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