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Public Health Law Map - Beta 5 - Medical and Public Health Law Site

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diagnosis <strong>and</strong> treatment of their medical conditions. The correctional staff should<br />

not be in the position of dictating medical care decisions. Under no circumstances<br />

should access to proper medical care be used as a disciplinary tool. The prison<br />

officials do have the right to ensure that prisoners do not use untreated illness to<br />

avoid prison discipline <strong>and</strong> that prisoners’ medical conditions do not interfere with<br />

prison order.<br />

b) Right To Refuse <strong>Medical</strong> Care<br />

Prisoners have a liberty interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, in not<br />

being treated against their will. The extent of this liberty interest was defined in<br />

Washington v. Harper, [Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).] a case<br />

arising from a prisoner’s objection to being given antipsychotic medications. The<br />

Washington prison system provided elaborate administrative protections before an<br />

inmate could be medicated against his will. The Washington Supreme Court<br />

rejected these administrative protections as inadequate <strong>and</strong> required that an inmate<br />

be given a full adversarial hearing before being treated against his will:<br />

The [Washington Supreme] Court concluded that the “highly intrusive<br />

nature” of treatment with antipsychotic medications warranted greater<br />

procedural protections.… It held that, under the Due Process Clause, the<br />

State could administer antipsychotic medication to a competent,<br />

nonconsenting inmate only if, in a judicial hearing at which the inmate had<br />

the full panoply of adversarial procedural protections, the State proved by<br />

“clear, cogent, <strong>and</strong> convincing” evidence that the administration of<br />

antipsychotic medication was both necessary <strong>and</strong> effective for furthering a<br />

compelling state interest. [Washington v. Harper at 1035.]<br />

Mr. Harper, the prisoner who brought this action, claimed that the prison<br />

authorities could not medicate him unless he was found to be mentally incompetent<br />

in an adversarial hearing. He further alleged that even if he was found to be<br />

incompetent, he could be medicated only if the fact finder determined that he<br />

would have consented to the medication had he been competent. The U.S. Supreme<br />

Court rejected these claims, finding that the prison’s policy was constitutionally<br />

adequate. The Court’s rationale for endorsing the prison’s policy is relevant to the<br />

general problem of prison health because it accepts expert decision making as a<br />

substitute for adversarial decision making.<br />

The Court reviewed the Washington Supreme Court’s decision to determine what<br />

facts would support a decision to force antipsychotic medication on a prisoner <strong>and</strong><br />

what procedural protections were necessary to determine those facts. It agreed that<br />

Harper had a liberty interest in not being medicated against his will. However, the<br />

Court held that this liberty interest was sufficiently protected by the prison’s<br />

administrative proceeding, which required that a psychiatrist certify the treatment’s<br />

appropriateness.<br />

The Court’s acceptance of expert decision making as a substitute for an adversary<br />

677

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