30.10.2012 Views

A Proposal for a Standard With Innovation Management System

A Proposal for a Standard With Innovation Management System

A Proposal for a Standard With Innovation Management System

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Oscar Cristi, José Ernesto Amorós and Juan Pablo Couyoumdjian<br />

respected. We will explain these issues with more detail immediately below. In subsequent sections<br />

we will present the data and variables we use, the proposed econometric models and estimation<br />

strategies, and our results. We conclude with some brief comments about the implications of our<br />

work.<br />

2. Economic development and In<strong>for</strong>mality: An analytic framework<br />

In many countries the in<strong>for</strong>mal sector represents an important fraction of the official gross domestic<br />

product. At the same time, however, important variations across countries exist regarding the relative<br />

size of such in<strong>for</strong>mal economies. Recent studies that have examined the determinants of in<strong>for</strong>mality<br />

have found that the size of the so-called in<strong>for</strong>mal sector in an economy depends on the extent of taxburdens<br />

and labor market restrictions, as well as on the quality of government institutions (Loayza,<br />

1996; Servén, Oviedo &Loayza, 2005; Schneider, Buehn& Montenegro, 2010). Thus, in<strong>for</strong>mality can<br />

be said to be a consequence of weak institutions, a way to avoid expensive regulations, and to<br />

prevent poverty and starvation (de Soto, 1989).<br />

Following most of the literature on the subject here we define shadow economy or in<strong>for</strong>mality as the<br />

use of illegal means to pursue legal activities that have a positive economic value (Gerxhani, 2004;<br />

Schneider, Buehn& Montenegro, 2010).<br />

It is especially interesting to us to note that in a very significant sense in<strong>for</strong>mality also represents an<br />

entrepreneurial activity. It represents an individual’s best response to aspecific environment of weak<br />

institutions, corruption, or regulations that limit an agent’s opportunities in terms of obtaining a <strong>for</strong>mal<br />

job, or opening a small business in the <strong>for</strong>mal sector of the economy. Be<strong>for</strong>e we continue it is<br />

important to explain that considering these constraints does not mean that there is no explicit choice<br />

on the economic agents part when they decide to engage in an in<strong>for</strong>mal activity. This is, indeed, a<br />

result of the equilibrium approach of a segmented labor market (Harris &Todaro, 1970). Economic<br />

decision-making always takes place in the context of specific restrictions or constraints.<br />

Hernando de Soto’s (1989) work provides classic illustrations as to the issues involved in the in<strong>for</strong>mal<br />

economy analysis. Consider, <strong>for</strong> example, his examination of the state of affairs of the public transport<br />

industry in Lima, Peru; where more than half of the industry is part of the shadow economy. These<br />

activities are organized in this way because of the excessive burden of regulations of this sector.<br />

These in<strong>for</strong>mal activities surely are entrepreneurial in nature, as de Soto convincingly argues.<br />

We are aware that de Soto and other authors have argued that the problem of in<strong>for</strong>mality has multiple<br />

dimensions. Some of the related issues are social in character and concern the lack of opportunities<br />

some people have and the impact this has on poverty and living conditions in general. Others are<br />

related to the rationality, or irrationality, of many economic regulations that impact on the size of the<br />

in<strong>for</strong>mal sector. Finally, the efficiency of an entrepreneurial economy in this context has also been<br />

questioned. This is an important point that we should consider more carefully.<br />

In an important paper LaPorta and Shleifer (2008) have shown that firms established in the <strong>for</strong>mal<br />

sector are the main sources of productivity in the economy. This is consistent with a view that mainly<br />

sees in<strong>for</strong>mality as a transitory alternative. This ‘survival’ aspect of in<strong>for</strong>mality also points to an overall<br />

vulnerability of shadow entrepreneurship (Tokman 2007).<br />

This evidence does notpreclude our argument in the sense that undertaking an entrepreneurial<br />

activity in<strong>for</strong>mally represents an explicit decision by an acting agent. This decision may involve both<br />

truly voluntary and other not so voluntary components. The ‘<strong>for</strong>ced’ character of in<strong>for</strong>mality may,<br />

however, be over-emphasized. Like this, agents voluntarily decide to work in the in<strong>for</strong>mal sector in<br />

many cases, as explained by Maloney (2004).<br />

At any rate we are really concerned with the ‘macro’ consequences of these ‘micro’ motives.In other<br />

words, the question we are interested in examining here relates to the effects of in<strong>for</strong>mality on<br />

economic development. Apparently, the way we measure ‘in<strong>for</strong>mality’ is key here. Our precise<br />

understanding of the concept of ‘economic development’ is likewise very important in terms of our<br />

analysis. Be<strong>for</strong>e we go into these issues, it is important to consider the precise avenues through<br />

which we expect to find the effects of in<strong>for</strong>mality on economic development.<br />

117

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!