2. Philosophy - Stefano Franchi

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A BSOLUTE( S ) SPIELEN
ing is play,” tout court, without further explication. In this case, we might reverse the
former question and ask instead whether philosophy is up to the task that Spiel demands of
it. In other words, we might ask whether Hegel lets philosophy be carried over to the uni-
verse of play or if this cautious introduction of play into the body of philosophy does not
end up forcing play to become something else (by privileging one of its aspects, for exam-
ple).
This points to the possible existence of an important difference between the road that
brings to the end and the end itself, the place the roads leads to. Prima facie, at least, there
seems to be an almost unsurmountable logical difference between the search for the truth
and the truth itself, that is, between the process and the result of that process. In the classical
Hegelian terms we already mentioned above, the difference we are talking above is nothing
but the difference between the mere love for knowledge and the form of knowing that will
finally be able to call itself a science (Wissenschaft). The Hegelian twist on this topic, of
course, is that the process is part of the solution, since the history of philosophy (the path)
is what is necessarily required in order to reach the closure of the circle of circles that marks
the completion of philosophy. In other words, the solution is nothing else than the complet-
ed process. In this case as well, though, it should be remarked that the relationship between
the completed circle, e.g. the reached end, and the path bringing to it, e.g. philosophy, can-
not be totally on a logical par.
Two points must be underlined in connection with this issue. First of all, the present
effort consists precisely in trying to discern the features of the Hegel’s argument that are as
independent as possible from the specific solution given by the Hegelian system. Second,
it should be noted that the necessity that brings from philosophy to absolute knowing is not
necessarily valid in the other sense as well. In other words, even if Hegel shows that the
science of the experience of consciousness must necessarily conclude in a Spiel-like Abso-
lute Knowing, does it follow that the latter is reachable only from the former? Does the ne-
cessity arrow, to put it differently, work in the other sense as well? This does not seem to
be case, within the confines of the Hegelian resources we have exploited so far.