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2. Philosophy - Stefano Franchi

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N ON-PHILOSOPHY<br />

new fields of inquiry, but it will have to turn over the newly discovered terrains to the spe-<br />

cialized, empirical sciences if there has to be any hope of gaining real knowledge. Philos-<br />

ophy’s task is to play an avant-garde, exploratory role until the heavy troops of science<br />

arrive to consolidate the conquest. This interpretation has become a common sense of sort<br />

in the discussion of the relationship between philosophy and the empirical sciences. Parti-<br />

sans of this interpretation like to point out the progressive detachment of empirical disci-<br />

plines from the main body of philosophical inquiry as a proof of their views. In the English-<br />

speaking world, this interpretation is perhaps best known through the words of William<br />

James, who called philosophy “the residuum of questions still unanswered. “The opposi-<br />

tion between philosophy and the sciences — he wrote at the end of his career in Some prob-<br />

lems of <strong>Philosophy</strong>— is unjustly founded, for the sciences are themselves branches of the<br />

tree of philosophy. As fast as questions got accurately answered, the answered were called<br />

‘scientific,’ and what men call ‘philosophy’ is but the residuum of questions still unan-<br />

swered.” 4 Thus, the coming of age of physics from a branch of “natural philosophy” to a<br />

fully-fledged, mathematized scientific discipline represents the paradigmatic example of a<br />

development that sees in the progressive (and still incomplete) maturation of psychology<br />

its last instance. Critics of the Western philosophical tradition on both sides of the Atlantic<br />

share this view 5 .<br />

In a somewhat similar vein, someone might accept the Hegelian distinction as the in-<br />

dication that philosophy, if viable at all, needs a radical reform that will give it a badly need-<br />

ed object of inquiry. Thus, for example, one might propose that philosophy can (or has to)<br />

become “applied” in order to survive. In a sense, the “linguistic turn” in analytic philoso-<br />

phy, as well as Wittgenstein’s ruminations about philosophical problems dissolving them-<br />

selves, can be traced back to such an issue.<br />

4. See William James, Some Problems of <strong>Philosophy</strong> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979) (Orig<br />

ed. 1911) 1<strong>2.</strong> James, however, is careful not to dismiss, indeed, to defend, metaphysics, e.g. the narrower<br />

meaning of philosophy stripped down of its scientific branches. His “Radical Empiricism” aspire<br />

to be a fully fledged metaphysical system where such issues as the question of being find, if not a<br />

final answer, at least a proper treatment.<br />

5. This view may be pushed as far as claiming that philosophy has actually reached its self-effacing goal<br />

since “all” possible fields have been turned over to the sciences. Jürgen Habermas has suggested this<br />

view over and over again, most notably in The Discourse of Modernity .<br />

129

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