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2. Philosophy - Stefano Franchi

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A RTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AS A NON- PHILOSOPHICAL PROJECT<br />

but change in approach from the more general to the more specific: totally top-down for<br />

philosophy, totally bottom-up for psychology, with AI resting somewhere in the middle:<br />

AI can be as abstract and as “unempirical” as philosophy in the questions<br />

uit attempts to answer, but at the same time, it should be as expplicit and as<br />

particularistic in its models as phychology as its best. (113)<br />

In other words, the substratum of the continuum is built on the identity of topic (and<br />

more precisely, identity of a basic intuition), while the differentiation is provided by the dif-<br />

ferent form (i.e the different methods/approaches). Thus, the “abstract” character of re-<br />

search in AI is justified by postulating a higher level of similarity between philosophy and<br />

science itself (under the guises of psychology). It is this similarity that allows AI to share<br />

its content with philosophy without, however, being tainted with the latter’s fruitless “arm-<br />

chair philosophizing.” To put it slightly differently: AI can have the same content of phi-<br />

losophy with a different form because it is science itself that shares with it the same content<br />

with a different form.<br />

But this description is stuill inadequate to render the meaning and scope of Φ−Ψ con-<br />

tinuum situation postulated by Dennett. Indeed, since the difference between philosophy<br />

and psychology is provided by a gradient of “attention to empirical details,” and since such<br />

a concern is, in itself, a (and perhaps the most typical) scientific preoccupation, it follows<br />

that the continuum represents only a differentiation among different ways of doing science,<br />

and not, as Dennett would have it, a bridge betwee science and philosophy. To put it differ-<br />

ently:Dennett can build his bridge between science and philosophy because philosophy has<br />

never been in the picture in the first place, having effectively being reduced to an “abstract”<br />

form of scientific investigation in the traditional sense. We are not confronted, then, with a<br />

difference between science and philosophy along the axis of same content/different form,<br />

but rather with an identity between (abstract) science and (concrete) science where all the<br />

content come from science and there is no philosophy left, either as content or as form.<br />

This fact has some remarkable consequences for the status of Artificial Intelligence.<br />

As I remarked at the end of the previous section, a solution to the question about AI identity<br />

must preserve the distinctive characters of the three fields that we have seen it trodding up-<br />

167

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