2. Philosophy - Stefano Franchi

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P HILOSOPHY, NON-PHILOSOPHY, AND SCIENCE
2. On the various meanings of “X is
not a science”
Before I proceed to a more thorough analysis of Artificial Intelligence’s scope and
methods, I need to clear the ground from a methodological objection that may be immedi-
ately raised. My answer, I hope, will also clarify the scope of my own interest in AI.
By putting Artificial Intelligence at the center of my interests here, I may be accused
of committing a double simplification: first, Artificial Intelligence is usually taken to be
only one components of a broader, and more diversified research program generally known
as Cognitive Science(s) that includes disciplines as diverse as neurophysiology, linguistics,
psychology and philosophy. Thus, I might be accused of taking the part for the whole. My
answer to this objection is that research in Artificial Intelligence is at the core, in a very
strong sense, of the mosaic of disciplines included under the umbrella of Cognitive Sci-
ence: the model of the mind as an information-processing machine essentially analogous to
a (digital) computer is the basic model of Artificial Intelligence and it is such a model that
has been exported to other disciplines. To put it differently: it is not linguistics per se (that
is, in virtue of its topic + methodology + history), nor philosophy per se that grant those
disciplines access to the ”mind’s new science.” Rather, it is, and quite explicitly, linguistics’
(and philosophy’s) willingness to accept AI’s basic model and apply to its field that makes
it a viable candidate for the new discipline. (need: refs to basic texts in AI/Cognitive Sci-
ence research, plus the masters of the field, and in particular Pylyshyn et similar). Thus, I
am quite justified in putting Artificial Intelligence squarely at the center of my analysis. A
second objection may be raised, however: it might be said that I am again, simplifying to
the extreme insofar as I take the central model of AI (information-based processing, etc.)
as the paradigm of Cognitive Science. It is true, one might say, that the aggregation of dis-
ciplines forming Cognitive Science has been built upon AI’s basic model, but not necessar-
ily. There is more to cognitive science that cognitivism (as what I called the basic model is
often called), it is sometimes proclaimed. Francisco Varela has been the most vocal propo-
nent of this view, and his appeals for a broader and richer definition of Cognitive Science