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2. Philosophy - Stefano Franchi

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220<br />

S TRUCTURES (AND SPACES)<br />

Two more points need to be stressed in this first, preliminary account of structures, the<br />

first concerning the formal and symbolic character of the described systems, and the second<br />

pertaining to their ontological status. The structures Lévi-Strauss tries to uncover are for-<br />

mally describable, at least in principle. That is, they can be expressed, in the usual fashion,<br />

as axiomatized formal theories, using some kind of mathematical logic. Second, the anal-<br />

ysis of kinship or of mythological thought deals with systems that are supposed to be ab-<br />

stract structures mediating our relationship with the world. In other words, they are<br />

unconscious, in the strict technical sense of enjoying a logical and epistemological prece-<br />

dence on conscious, observable behavior. The basic act of differentiation, of taxonomic<br />

classification, is what Lévi-Strauss sees at work in the “Savage mind,” and it is precisely<br />

what constitutes culture as such: a system of abstract (i.e. non-perceptually founded) clas-<br />

sifications that mediates every exchange between man and nature and/or man and man and<br />

actually constitutes a system of conceptual understanding. Man’s relation to the world is<br />

never naive and immediate, but always mediated by the taxonomic system. In the words of<br />

Lévi-Strauss: “Savage thought does not distinguish the moment of observation and that of<br />

interpretation any more than, on observing them, one first registers an interlocutor’s signs<br />

and then tries to understand them: when he speaks, the signs expressed carry with them<br />

their meanings.” 12<br />

The structural method, therefore, needs to find a closed structure regulated by a formal<br />

law ruling the unconscious relations in order to explain the observable (“conscious”) phe-<br />

nomena. Let us see how this requirement translates into a theory when applied to the study<br />

of myths.<br />

For starters, it must remarked that the decision to apply the structural method to my-<br />

thology is dictated by strong epistemological reasons: what we, twentieth century observ-<br />

1<strong>2.</strong> Claude Lévi-Strauss, La pensée sauvage …;Engl. tr. 223. Although to be commended for the effort, the<br />

English title cannot but conveys the impression that the work is a revived XVII century overambitious<br />

travel-book on the “alien” minds of the primitive. Notice, instead, that pensée, in French, is actually<br />

both “thinking” and “thought” and, furthermore, that pensée sauvage can be read both in the subjective<br />

and objective genitive, being both the pensée of the savages and the savage in/of the pensée The book<br />

wants to show, in fact, that the two are essentially the same and that they are not so savage. “Thinking<br />

in the wild,” may be a closer, although perhaps less elegant rendition.

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