2. Philosophy - Stefano Franchi

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P HILOSOPHY, NON-PHILOSOPHY, AND SCIENCE
between philosophy and AI. Robert Cummins and John Pollock, for example, in the intro-
duction to a volume of essays on philosophy and AI, write: “The articulation of a theory of
rationality is a complicated matter and has been the topic of philosophical investigations in
epistemology, decision theory and practical reasoning literally for centuries.” 22 They
ground the possibility of a fruitful collaboration between the two disciplines in the mutual
interest for such a theory. This interpretation is less formal than the previous one but, still
too narrow to do justice to the specific problems the texts present.
This terminological remark prompts me to emphasize a different, and more substantial
element of my analysis. In identifying AI (and Structuralism) with the term of “non-philos-
ophy” I explicitly want to underline both the similarity and the difference between them and
philosophy, in this extremely broad sense. The negative particle stresses a difference that
can (or does) takes place only within a strong continuity. It is, in other words, a determinate
negation that can take place only because something essentially (historically, at least) be-
longing to philosophy is maintained whereas, at the same time something else (historically
essential to it as well) is denied.
Thus, what is at stake is not the determination of whether Artificial Intelligence has any
“rightful” claim to being a science, whether it is or not conceptually confused or internally
inconsistent. 23 Nor is it a discussion of the fruitful contributions that philosophy can bring
to AI and Structuralism or vice versa. The different question I will try to ask concerns, in-
stead, what is involved in Artificial Intelligence’s conflictual relationship with philosophy.
I will argue that the subject matter of both Artificial Intelligence and Structuralism (more
or less self-consciously) is equivalent to the subject matter of philosophy and that this hap-
pens precisely because of the peculiar relationship of negation that these disciplines enter-
tain with the history of Western metaphysics (or some samples thereof). I cannot, of course,
consider “Western philosophy” in its entirety, nor do I think it is feasible. Such an approach
would probably make impossible any precise delimitation of the thesis to be discussed.
22. Robert Cummins and John Pollock, Philosophy and AI; essays at the interface (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1991), 4.
23. See John Searle, for an example of a philosopher defending all these three thesis.