2. Philosophy - Stefano Franchi

T HE ANACLASTIC ILLUSION OF A TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY
the objective content of the structure involved but, at best, only the logical architecture of
the theory.
The problem is, simply stated, that the explanatory power of the scientific theory is
completely lost or, better, overwhelmed by the hyper-generativity of the rule-system. I shall
try to make clear Petitot's diagnosis with the example of chess: a “theory” of chess which
would reduce the game to a system of rules (properly formalized and axiomatized) would
be completely useless in the effort of interpreting a determinate, actual game (say, Karpov-
Kasparov IV). The theory being so powerful that it can generate all possible games, it can
only determine whether a certain object is a chess game or not. A remarkably poor result
for a theory of chess, since what is interesting in the game is that 90% (and maybe more)
of the possible games are never played. In other words, a “real” theory of chess (and, actu-
ally, what a chess player mean by the term) must deal with strategies, openings, forced sac-
rifices, etc. The concept might seem trivial, and perhaps it is in the case of chess. Petitot's
thesis, however, is not, since he claims that many contemporary disciplines are exactly in
the situation of the hypothetical chess theorist. Consider biology, for example:
The genome controls form and development. Its mastery and its control
therefore enable the control of its effects. But this does not imply the nonexistence
of autonomous, specific, and ideal morphological constraints. By
equating genetic control with determining cause, it is postulated without
further inquiry that there is nothing more to explain in what is being controlled.
As Jacques Monod claimed, form is causally reducible to the primary
structure of proteins: the remainder being dependent only upon
thermodynamics processes. [...] Indeed, the neo-Darwinian paradigm is a
conceptual system whose apparent ‘evidence’ precisely renders unintelligible
morphological phenomena. It attributes these merely to chance and negates
any necessity in the order of form, any laws of the form. 49
Briefly, the first immediate consequence of the nominalistic approach is that it is im-
possible to give an account of the self-determination and of the dynamic stability of the
structures as Gestalten, and therefore of their closure. This is the theoretical source, accord-
49. Jean Petitot, “Structure…” 1001.
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