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2. Philosophy - Stefano Franchi

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158<br />

P HILOSOPHY, NON-PHILOSOPHY, AND SCIENCE<br />

ophy of mind, etc. 39 Instead, Aaron Sloman, whom we take here as representative of a large<br />

class of instances, provides the classical form of this argument: “computer programs pro-<br />

vide the only currently available language for formulating rigorous and testable theories<br />

about such processes [as perceiving, thinking, remembering, etc.] So I conclude that in or-<br />

der to make real advances […] philosophers, like psychologists and linguists, will need to<br />

learn about the developments in the design of computing systems, programming languages<br />

and artificial intelligence models.” 40<br />

Shoam’s and Sloman’s claims make particularly clear, however, that the relationship<br />

between AI and philosophy, is presently quite conflictual, because it is either AI that must<br />

take over from philosophy a set of problems or intuitions and develop them differently, or<br />

it is philosophy that has to radically change its methodology, and in fact turn into AI, in or-<br />

der to achieve real progress. AI is allowed to turn its gaze toward philosophy, only if it<br />

maintains its theoretical distance, unless that distance is vanished by the elimination (or su-<br />

blation?) of philosophy itself in a time to come. In order to understand the sources of the<br />

present conflict between AI and philosophy, therefore, it is important to turn the gaze from<br />

the utopian future to the reality of the present. In other words, it is necessary to consider<br />

these claims in a broader framework and try to determine what can be concluded about AI’s<br />

identity from its conflictual relationship with philosophy.<br />

We must preliminarily acknowledge two related issues, though, to guide the discus-<br />

sion. The first one is methodological and concerns the epistemological status of these<br />

claims: they represent AI’s self-perception and, as such, consist of wishes and self-judg-<br />

ments. It follows that they cannot be taken as true nor dismissed as inescapably biased.<br />

Rather, they represent important clues in any assessment of the relationship between AI and<br />

39. See Yoav Shoam, “Agent-oriented programming,” Artificial Intelligence 60, 1 (1993) 51-9<strong>2.</strong>; John<br />

McCarthy, “What has AI in Common with <strong>Philosophy</strong>?”, Proceedings of IJCAI ‘95 (Los Altos, CA:<br />

Morgan Kaufman,1995), now available at: http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/,Güzeldere and I have<br />

advocated a similar position in Güven Güzeldere and <strong>Stefano</strong> <strong>Franchi</strong>, “Mindless Mechanisms, Mindful<br />

Constructions,” <strong>Stefano</strong> <strong>Franchi</strong> and Güven Güzeldere, eds., Constructions of the Mind, Special issue<br />

of the Stanford Humanities Review, 4, 2, 1995, ix-xxxi.<br />

40. Aaron Sloman, The Computer Revolution in <strong>Philosophy</strong>: <strong>Philosophy</strong>, Science and Models of Mind,<br />

(Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978) 83; see also Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained<br />

(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993),

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