Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 2, Vignette 5 Page 83
about 15 kilometers from Mulla Omar to the site and since the raiding
party had to bypass a Soviet unit deployed in Gazak, the departure
time was set at dusk (about 2000 hours). The party would move from
Mulla Omar through Gazak to reassemble briefly at Lewano Kandow.
The Mujahideen force moved out in small groups following each other
on the same route all the way to Lewano Kandow. A pair of reconnaissance
patrols moved on the flanks and one moved to the front of
the column—keeping within voice contact distance.
When the force reached a water spring at the Lewano Kandow, Major
Sher Aqa issued the last coordinating instructions and ordered the
groups to open fire when he did. This would signal the start of the raid.
From their Lewano Kandow assembly area, the different elements of the
raiding party moved separately toward their designated areas.
Just before midnight, all groups were in place. Everything was
quiet around the transmitter site. At Major Sher Aqa's signal, the
assault team opened fire on the site and began the attack. The support
team covered their advance. RPG rounds set the wooden buildings on
fire and soon fire swept the site. The defenders at the site panicked
and failed to put up an organized resistance. The assault team overran
the site, killed several soldiers, captured five Kalashnikov assault
rifles and demolished the transmitter station.
The DRA quickly responded by moving a tank column from the Pule
Charkhi garrison to the site. The column crossed the bridge over the
Kabul River but then left the main road and bypassed the Mujahideen
blocking positions established by the containment (holding) team of
Sayed Hasan Khan. The tanks, driving with their headlights off, cut
across the plain to the east of the Mujahideen, cutting off their escape
route. A young Mujahideen named Babrak hit one tank with an RPG-
7 rocket and set it on fire. But the rest of the column moved swiftly to
the south-west.
Fearing encirclement, the containment (holding) team and the
assault team immediately broke contact and, without notifying Major
Sher Aqa, pulled out toward the Lewano Kandow, leaving the support
team behind. As Commander Sher Aqa was desperately trying to establish
contact with the other teams, he heard tanks moving to the rear of
his position. By this time, all electric lights in the area were extinguished,
but the transmitter station continued to burn brightly. The
Mujahideen and the DRA tank column both used the fire for orientation.
Facing a threatening situation, Major Sher Aqa instructed his men
not to panic but to exfiltrate individually through the intervals
between the tanks. Using masking terrain, his Mujahideen managed