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Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

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Chapter 1, Vignette 12 Page 51<br />

On <strong>the</strong> morn<strong>in</strong>g of 20 October, <strong>the</strong>re were an unusual number of<br />

helicopters fly<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> area. Asil Khan felt that this <strong>in</strong>dicated that a<br />

convoy was leav<strong>in</strong>g Kabul and so he moved his men <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> ambush<br />

site and waited for <strong>the</strong> column to arrive. Around 1000 hours, a large<br />

supply column, escorted by tanks and APCs, approached <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> position. Helicopters were fly<strong>in</strong>g overhead. As <strong>the</strong> lead<strong>in</strong>g<br />

tanks and APCs reached <strong>the</strong> kill zone, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> detonated<br />

<strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>es. One tank blew up and <strong>the</strong> column came to a sudden halt.<br />

The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> opened fire on <strong>the</strong> column. But <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> were<br />

so concerned about mak<strong>in</strong>g a fast getaway, that <strong>the</strong>ir fire was not too<br />

effective aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> vulnerable column. They destroyed just one truck<br />

with <strong>the</strong>ir RPGs before <strong>the</strong>y broke contact and fled unsca<strong>the</strong>d to<br />

friendly territory <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> west.<br />

COMMENTARY: The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> achieved surprise but failed to exploit<br />

it fully once <strong>the</strong> column stopped. The commander's desire to safeguard<br />

his force prevented <strong>the</strong>ir fur<strong>the</strong>r damag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> column. Still, a tank<br />

and a truck is a good days work for a 15-man ambush. Proper selection<br />

of <strong>the</strong> ambush site is key and this area was very open and offered<br />

little protection to <strong>the</strong> force. Some 12 kilometers fur<strong>the</strong>r south is <strong>the</strong><br />

Kotal-e Takht (<strong>the</strong> Takht pass) which is far more suitable for an<br />

ambush. The terra<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>re also allows surprise and provides better<br />

protection and concealed exit routes for <strong>the</strong> ambush<strong>in</strong>g force. An<br />

ambush<strong>in</strong>g force could fight much longer <strong>in</strong> this area and <strong>in</strong>flict more<br />

damage on a column. However, <strong>the</strong>re are certa<strong>in</strong> limitations <strong>in</strong> select<strong>in</strong>g<br />

an ambush site <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> area. First of all, <strong>Mujahideen</strong> groups generally<br />

operated on <strong>the</strong>ir home turf. Act<strong>in</strong>g outside <strong>the</strong>ir home turf could<br />

have unfavorable political, and support ramifications. Secondly, <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> wanted to harass <strong>the</strong>ir enemy as close to <strong>the</strong> capital as<br />

possible for political and propaganda reasons. Attacks at <strong>the</strong> gates of<br />

Kabul were more significant than attacks fur<strong>the</strong>r out. F<strong>in</strong>ally, s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />

<strong>the</strong> area is very open, an ambush here had a good chance at surprise<br />

s<strong>in</strong>ce it is not an obvious ambush site.

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