Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders
Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders
Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders
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Page 298 The O<strong>the</strong>r Side of <strong>the</strong> Mounta<strong>in</strong>: <strong>Mujahideen</strong> <strong>Tactics</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Soviet</strong>-<strong>Afghan</strong> <strong>War</strong><br />
In <strong>the</strong> fall of 1984, Khan Mohammad (my deputy) and I were both<br />
away from our base at <strong>the</strong> same time. I was <strong>in</strong> Iran. Informants told<br />
<strong>the</strong> government that we were both away and so <strong>the</strong> government<br />
attacked our base <strong>in</strong> our absence. However, <strong>the</strong> day that <strong>the</strong> enemy<br />
forces attacked our base, Khan Mohammad returned to our base. It<br />
was five days before <strong>the</strong> feast of sacrifice (Eid-al-Adha). The enemy<br />
moved from Delaram to <strong>the</strong> pla<strong>in</strong> some 15 kilometers north of us—<br />
just north of <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> road. They established a base <strong>the</strong>re. S<strong>in</strong>ce it<br />
is desert, <strong>the</strong>y could move <strong>in</strong> any direction. They attacked our base<br />
<strong>the</strong> next day. There were only 70 or 80 <strong>Mujahideen</strong> <strong>in</strong> base at <strong>the</strong><br />
time. Our SOP for defense aga<strong>in</strong>st an attack was to spread <strong>the</strong> forces<br />
over a large area at strong po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> some 20 villages. The enemy<br />
would usually attack from <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>ast to <strong>the</strong> southwest through<br />
<strong>the</strong> green zone to <strong>the</strong> base area. He would also send a flank<strong>in</strong>g<br />
detachment to <strong>the</strong> Pul-e Ghurghori bridge and lodge <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Radzay<br />
Mounta<strong>in</strong> to encircle my force and p<strong>in</strong> us <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> green zone. My<br />
force had to fight <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> green zone because <strong>the</strong> surround<strong>in</strong>g desert<br />
was too flat and exposed for combat. We fought <strong>the</strong> enemy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
green zone by confront<strong>in</strong>g him with multiple pockets of resistance<br />
anchored <strong>in</strong> fortified fight<strong>in</strong>g positions. When <strong>the</strong> enemy tried to<br />
concentrate aga<strong>in</strong>st one pocket, <strong>Mujahideen</strong> from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r pockets<br />
would take him <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> flanks and rear. The enemy could not fragment<br />
his force to deal with all <strong>the</strong> pockets, but had to stay toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
for security. We would let <strong>the</strong> enemy chase us from strongpo<strong>in</strong>t to<br />
strongpo<strong>in</strong>t and attack him whenever we could. Eventually, <strong>the</strong><br />
enemy force would become exhausted. When <strong>the</strong>ir water and supplies<br />
ran out, <strong>the</strong>y would break contact and go home.<br />
The enemy attack developed as usual and, by <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> day,<br />
<strong>the</strong> enemy force retired. Unfortunately, my deputy was killed dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> fight<strong>in</strong>g. In Iran, I heard about <strong>the</strong> enemy attack, ga<strong>the</strong>red what<br />
<strong>Mujahideen</strong> were available and started back to our base. The<br />
<strong>Mujahideen</strong> at <strong>the</strong> base evacuated <strong>the</strong>ir casualties to Qala-e Naw,<br />
Sheshaveh and Radzay. Informants told <strong>the</strong> enemy that <strong>the</strong> base<br />
commander was killed. They thought that I was dead and decided<br />
that it was <strong>the</strong> time to destroy all <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> green<br />
zone. I arrived on <strong>the</strong> third day after <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g battle. That night,<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r enemy column arrived and deployed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> desert north of<br />
us. I realized that <strong>the</strong>y were go<strong>in</strong>g to attack us. We had one BM-12,<br />
one s<strong>in</strong>gle-barreled 107mm rocket launcher, six 82mm recoilless<br />
rifles, five DShKs, three ZGU-ls, and 15 RPG-7s. I now had 120<br />
men. In addition to my <strong>Mujahideen</strong>, <strong>the</strong>re were HIH <strong>Mujahideen</strong> <strong>in</strong>