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Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

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Chapter 1, Vignette 16 Page 66<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir captured Kalashnikovs and o<strong>the</strong>r trophies to Pakistan where <strong>the</strong>y<br />

would sell <strong>the</strong>m and <strong>the</strong>n give <strong>the</strong> money to <strong>the</strong>ir families to live on.<br />

Although <strong>the</strong> popular concept of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> combatant is a<br />

hardened warrior clutch<strong>in</strong>g a Kalashnikov assault rifle, <strong>the</strong> most<br />

important <strong>Mujahideen</strong> weapon <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflict was <strong>the</strong> RPG-7 anti-tank<br />

grenade launcher. This <strong>Soviet</strong>-manufactured, short-range weapon<br />

allowed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> to knock out tanks, trucks and, occasionally,<br />

helicopters. The RPG was a great equalizer and a great weapon <strong>in</strong> an<br />

ambush. Although <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> were light <strong>in</strong>fantry, heavier crewserved<br />

weapons gave <strong>the</strong>m more range and stay<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>in</strong> a fight.<br />

Mortars, rockets, recoilless rifles and heavy mach<strong>in</strong>e guns were essential<br />

to <strong>the</strong> force that <strong>in</strong>tended to hold its ground for a time aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />

mechanized <strong>Soviet</strong> and DRA forces.<br />

The standard <strong>Soviet</strong>/DRA convoy had a group of armored vehicles at<br />

<strong>the</strong> front of <strong>the</strong> convoy, more armored vehicles spaced evenly throughout<br />

<strong>the</strong> convoy and ano<strong>the</strong>r group of armored vehicles constitut<strong>in</strong>g a<br />

rear guard. The convoy might have a helicopter or ground advance<br />

guard or patrol sweep <strong>the</strong> route prior to movement. Sometimes a m<strong>in</strong>edetection/clear<strong>in</strong>g<br />

force would precede <strong>the</strong> convoy, although m<strong>in</strong>e-clear<strong>in</strong>g<br />

was usually <strong>the</strong> responsibility of <strong>the</strong> unit guard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> road and <strong>the</strong><br />

convoy would not start until <strong>the</strong> unit had given <strong>the</strong> "all clear."<br />

Sometimes a convoy would have artillery groups move with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

column and "leap-frog" to provide rapid, on-call fire support.<br />

When hit, <strong>the</strong> convoy's standard reaction was to leave armored<br />

vehicles <strong>in</strong>side <strong>the</strong> kill zone to return fire while <strong>the</strong> trucks drove out of<br />

<strong>the</strong> kill zone. If <strong>the</strong> armored vehicles chased <strong>the</strong> ambushers away, <strong>the</strong><br />

convoy would cont<strong>in</strong>ue. If <strong>the</strong> armored vehicles could not deal with <strong>the</strong><br />

ambush, helicopter gunships could usually drive <strong>the</strong> ambushers from<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir positions. The convoy commander tried to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement<br />

of his convoy and would not usually turn forces around to deal<br />

with ambushes. Sometimes this meant that an ambush would split a<br />

convoy. The <strong>Soviet</strong>s and DRA seldom dismounted <strong>in</strong>fantry to pursue<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir ambushers s<strong>in</strong>ce convoy movement had priority, and <strong>the</strong>y seldom<br />

had enough <strong>in</strong>fantry accompany<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> convoy to pursue <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>ir neighborhood and overpower <strong>the</strong>m.<br />

The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> seldom hit <strong>the</strong> head of a column unless terra<strong>in</strong><br />

allowed <strong>the</strong>m to bottle-up <strong>the</strong> column by do<strong>in</strong>g so. The <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />

preferred to hit <strong>the</strong> middle of <strong>the</strong> convoy where <strong>the</strong>re were fewer<br />

armored vehicles. If possible, <strong>the</strong>y tried to seal off <strong>the</strong> section of convoy<br />

<strong>the</strong>y were attack<strong>in</strong>g if <strong>the</strong>y meant to loot it. <strong>Mujahideen</strong> usually<br />

prepared fight<strong>in</strong>g positions at <strong>the</strong> ambush site which enabled <strong>the</strong>m to

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