Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Page 338 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
and was headed northeast. He did not have much communications at
that time. In the late afternoon, he learned that the fighting was
focused at his base. He went to his other bases in Kandahar and
gathered Mujahideen and MRL. He then took the same circuitous
route back to his base. As they reached Shahr-e Safa, the Soviets had
already gone, so he sent his Kandahar reinforcements back and
went on to Chaghni. The survivors were gone and those left were all
dead. It was a mess. Everything destroyed or damaged. Booby traps
and mines were all over the area. Gradually the surviving Mujahideen
returned. Commander Razek decided that this was no longer a
safe place for a permanent base and converted it to a mobile base for
50 Mujahideen. Five days after we buried our dead, we packed 150
rockets and went to exact revenge on the Kandahar airport.
One night, some two weeks later, we buried our rockets or put
them in hideouts or safe-houses near Khoshab to the north of the
airfield. We had to do this very secretly, as we did not want the locals
to know. The next night, we set up our 150 rockets with remotecontrol
firing devices aimed at the airfield. The remote control firing
devices were essential because it is impossible to stay in the
open area after firing. The first salvo of 50 rockets fired at night.
After the first salvo, planes took off and hit the area at random. The
next salvo fired at sunrise arid the third salvo at 0700 hours—
about one hour later. After each salvo of 50 rockets, planes would
fly over and shoot at random, but there were no Mujahideen in the
area. After the third salvo, the enemy sent armored vehicles into
the area to search. They encircled the area and sent dismounted
infantry into the cordon. They found the spent launchers.
Most of the Soviet aircraft losses were from rocket attacks on
planes parked on the ground, not from air defense. This attack reportedly
damaged many aircraft. Before Stingers, Soviet and Chinese
SA-7s proved very ineffective. We only brought down two aircraft in
the Kandahar area with SA-7s.
COMMENTARY: The Soviet advance on Chaghni was slow, but the
Soviets were finally learning to dominate the high ground before
they moved their ground force. Apparently the Soviets had good
intelligence to support this attack. However, the Soviets did not
block all escape routes and the bulk of the Mujahideen force escaped.
Mujahideen reconnaissance, on the other hand, was lacking and
they were surprised. Still, the Mujahideen had plenty of time to hit
the Soviets or evacuate their base during the slow Soviet advance.