Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 8, Vignette 4 Page 225
COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen believed in the invulnerability of
their defenses and let the routines of positional defense dull their
alertness. The Soviets again were able to infiltrate a force deep
into the Mujahideen territory and take them by surprise. The lack
of Mujahideen discipline triggered the ambush, but apparently
triggered the ambush prematurely before the entire force was in the
kill zone. Mujahideen leaders led by consensus, force of personality
and moral persuasion.
The Mujahideen failed to man their defenses around the clock and
the Soviets were able to move through their unmanned positions and
surprise the Mujahideen. It is unclear whether the Soviets were in a
deliberate ambush or were waiting for night fall to move on Sotan to
attack the Mujahideen.
One of the problems that a guerrilla movement has is that the people
who suffer the retaliations for guerrilla actions are usually the
civilian populace. What starts as a popular cause, supported enthusiastically
by the populace, can sour when the local populace has to bear
the reprisals with no apparent end in sight. The local populace that
remains often just wants to be left alone by all sides. The Mujahideen
in this area lost a great deal of local support and, consequently, intelligence
information and early warning.
CHAPTER COMMENTARY
Mujahideen local security was often lax in those areas which they
controlled or which Soviet/DRA forces had not visited in awhile. Often,
Mujahideen local security was even lax in areas adjacent to major
Soviet and .DRA garrisons. KHAD infiltrators and informers often
managed to provide timely information that resulted in successful
raids. The Mujahideen often failed to post security at a sufficient distance
from their force to provide adequate warning. Instead, they
relied on local inhabitants to provide that warning. In areas where the
local populace had fled or were tired of the war, the Mujahideen were
blind. The factional nature of the Mujahideen also discouraged the distribution
of timely intelligence to all Mujahideen forces in an area.
The Mujahideen often failed to plan against raids, constitute a
ready reaction force, designate escape routes and assembly areas and
rehearse their defense. Aggressive Soviet or DRA raids had a good
chance of success against unprepared Mujahideen. The trick was to
withdraw before the Mujahideen had a chance to recover and pursue.