Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 1, Vignette 8 Page 33
observers were forward to adjust artillery fire during the night. Third,
the Mujahideen had surprise. The column had driven out on this road
unmolested and expected to return unopposed. The soldiers were cold
and tired, and their guard was down. The head of the column could see
Bagram airbase when they were hit. Fourth, the simultaneous attack
along the entire length of the column stripped the convoy commander
of any uncommmited force which he could use as an emergency
reserve. The Mujahideen occupied very wide ambush frontages relative
to their manpower and this allowed them to attack the entire convoy
simultaneously. In retrospect there is little more that the
Mujahideen could have done except employ mines and mortar fire on
the southern escape route.
The Soviet commander contributed to his own defeat. He had poor
intelligence on the area that he was travelling through and did not use
reconnaissance forces effectively. He did not use forward detachments
to seize dominant terrain and obvious chokepoints, such as the
Abdullah-e Burj bridge, in advance of the column. He was highly predictable
and used the same route to return that he had left on, yet
failed to post security along that route to support his movement. He
failed to leap-frog artillery groups along the column so that artillery
fire support was immediately available. He apparently did not have
helicopter gunships on stand-by to respond to ambush. He appears to
have not trained his force in standard counter-ambush drills and procedures.
He apparently lost control of the column within the first
minute of the ambush.
The Soviet force in Bagram was reluctant to go to the aid of the
beleagured column at night. Apparently they were afraid of also being
ambushed. This reluctance to leave the relative safety of their base
camp at night was to the Mujahideen advantage.