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Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

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VIGNETTE 14<br />

THE FALL OF CHAGHNI BASE CAMP<br />

by Commander Abdul Razek,<br />

Haji Pir Mohammad, and Amir Mohammad<br />

Chaghni base camp is <strong>in</strong> Shahr-e Safa District about 10 kilometers<br />

from Highway 1—<strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> highway from Kabul to Kandahar.<br />

We normally set ambushes on <strong>the</strong> south side of <strong>the</strong> road, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong><br />

north side is open between Shahr-e Safa and Kalat. There was only<br />

one place optimum for ambush—a six-kilometer stretch where a<br />

dry river bed parallels <strong>the</strong> road way. We could hide many <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> high ground overlook<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> road and escort vehicles<br />

could not cross <strong>the</strong> river bed to get up <strong>in</strong>to our ambush positions,<br />

s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> dry river banks were like sheer walls. Although no APC or<br />

tank could get across, we m<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> area between <strong>the</strong> road and<br />

<strong>the</strong> river bed anyway. The high ground of Sher Alikhan Mounta<strong>in</strong><br />

protected our withdrawal. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>re were no villages or villagers<br />

nearby to provide warn<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> enemy. We built permanent<br />

fight<strong>in</strong>g positions at this site and we ambushed <strong>the</strong> enemy at this<br />

site cont<strong>in</strong>ually, but <strong>the</strong>y always seemed surprised. The enemy<br />

convoy would usually reach our ambush site <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late afternoon<br />

s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>y left Kabul about 0800. The enemy usually sent tanks,<br />

BMPs and APCs to escort <strong>the</strong>ir convoys. We normally positioned our<br />

heavy weapons on favorable ground higher up and positioned our<br />

small arms forward.<br />

At <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t that we usually laid our ambushes, <strong>the</strong>re was one<br />

road that <strong>in</strong>tersected our area. It had to cross <strong>the</strong> river bed, but we<br />

usually m<strong>in</strong>ed that road as well for good measure. The normal reaction<br />

of <strong>the</strong> enemy convoy, when ambushed, was to drive off <strong>the</strong> road<br />

to <strong>the</strong> north to get out of range of our weapons. They never tried to<br />

attack us. Their trucks would be burn<strong>in</strong>g and destroyed, everyth<strong>in</strong>g<br />

would be <strong>in</strong> chaos and everyone was look<strong>in</strong>g to his own survival.<br />

There was no coord<strong>in</strong>ated response. Escort tanks and APCs would<br />

Abdul Razek was a major commander <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kandahar area. Several of <strong>the</strong> current Taliban<br />

leaders once worked for him. His command <strong>in</strong>cluded Shahr-e Safa District nor<strong>the</strong>ast of<br />

Kandahar. [Map sheet 2280, vie grid 6016].<br />

Haji Pir Mohammad was a subgroup commander for Abdul Razek <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kandahar area.<br />

Amir Mohammad was a combatant <strong>in</strong> Abdul Razek's group.

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