Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 12, Vignette 5 Page 353
up from their positions. As I saw the Soviets jump up, I yelled "Allah
Akbar"(God is the greatest) and we opened fire on them. This led to a
prolonged fire fight. My Mujahideen were spread in a single file and I
was the 16th person in the column. Dadgul was next to me, but we did
not really know exactly where the Soviets were and they did not know
exactly where we were. We fired at each other off and on. At approximately
2200 hours, we heard the sound of armored vehicle engines
moving toward us. They had come from the northwest at Pul-e Alam.
Mamur Abdul Ali began firing rockets in our support from his base in
Sepets. One landed close to us and the next went further on. The fifth
rocket landed in the enemy column. This slowed down the enemy column.
Akhunzada also started firing rockets at the enemy column from
his base. I instructed my Mujahideen to fall back to the mountains
near Abchakan and then move south of Sepets to the mountain valley
where the Mujahideen bases were located. It was 0200 when we
reached Akhunzada base. Sixteen of my Mujahideen were missing—
those who were in front of me in the column. The next morning at 1000
hours, we went forward and found Mohammaday, who was wounded
and my RPG-7 man who was killed. The rest of my Mujahideen had
gone on to Logar. I do not know what the Soviet losses were, but there
were reports that they had casualties. The Soviets never used that
particular ambush site again.
COMMENTARY: The Soviet ambush party probably came from the 108th
Motorized Rifle Division or the 103rd Airborne Division. Both were
garrisoned in Kabul. The 56th Air Assault Brigade at Gardez was
closer to the site, but the relief element came from the Kabul direction.
The Soviet ambush site was not well laid out. There was no attempt
to seal the kill zone. There were no firing lanes cleared, no aiming
stakes emplaced, no directional mines employed and no indirect fire
planned on the kill zone. The Soviet ambush was triggered by a lone
gunner and not by massed fire directed by the ambush commander.
The Soviet commander evidently did not know that he had a strungout
Mujahideen column, which could not mass fires, to his front. Once
night fell, the Mujahideen did not break contact and the ambush
commander then evidently felt that he was in contact with a large force
and called for an armored column to rescue him.
The Mujahideen movement plan was commendable. The commander
did not hazard his supplies until he had cleared the route and posted
security at key points. He coordinated with other factions to obtain
information and tactical intelligence. He moved spread out on open