16.11.2012 Views

Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Chapter 1, Vignette 16 Page 65<br />

Ten men cannot adequately handle four mortars, let alone eight.<br />

The <strong>Soviet</strong>s contributed to <strong>the</strong>ir own disaster. The forward security<br />

element "cleared" <strong>the</strong> area by simply driv<strong>in</strong>g through it and s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />

<strong>the</strong>y were not fired on, <strong>the</strong>y assumed that it was safe. This was a<br />

favorite <strong>Mujahideen</strong> ambush site complete with well-prepared positions.<br />

The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> had conducted several ambushes from this very<br />

site <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past. As a m<strong>in</strong>imum, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Soviet</strong>s should have sent a force to<br />

destroy <strong>the</strong> positions prior to <strong>the</strong> convoy departure. Then, <strong>the</strong> forward<br />

security element should have dismounted some troops to search <strong>the</strong><br />

area for possible ambush and held it until <strong>the</strong> convoy passed. The forward<br />

security element fur<strong>the</strong>r contributed to <strong>the</strong> disaster by stopp<strong>in</strong>g<br />

with<strong>in</strong> anti-tank weapons range (300-800 meters) <strong>in</strong> an area where <strong>the</strong><br />

terra<strong>in</strong> restricted vehicular movement and wait<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> convoy to<br />

catch up to it. When <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> fired on <strong>the</strong>se stationary targets,<br />

<strong>the</strong> forward security element became a burn<strong>in</strong>g blockade which<br />

trapped <strong>the</strong> convoy. Had <strong>the</strong> forward security element moved well<br />

ahead of <strong>the</strong> convoy, it would have allowed part of <strong>the</strong> convoy to escape<br />

south and enabled <strong>the</strong> forward security element to return to provide<br />

fire power to help extricate <strong>the</strong> trapped vehicles. Had <strong>the</strong> forward<br />

security element moved off <strong>the</strong> road to <strong>the</strong> west and taken up covered<br />

positions out of anti-tank weapons range, it could have provided considerable<br />

immediate firepower to <strong>the</strong> convoy.<br />

CHAPTER COMMENTARY<br />

The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> conducted ambushes for harassment or for spoils.<br />

Often, harass<strong>in</strong>g ambushes were small-scale ambushes which would<br />

only fire a few rounds <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> convoy to destroy or damage some vehicles.<br />

Then <strong>the</strong> ambushers would withdraw without attempt<strong>in</strong>g to loot<br />

<strong>the</strong> column before <strong>the</strong> convoy commander could react. Ambushes conducted<br />

for spoils (weapons, ammunition, food, cloth<strong>in</strong>g and o<strong>the</strong>r military<br />

supplies) were normally conducted by larger forces who could<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir positions for up to an hour. Still, <strong>the</strong> ambush was a<br />

short-term action designed to capitalize on surprise and terra<strong>in</strong>. Road<br />

blocks, discussed <strong>in</strong> a later chapter, were designed to fight <strong>the</strong> enemy<br />

to a standstill and prevent his passage for an extended period of time.<br />

Ambushes for spoils were essential to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> field. <strong>Mujahideen</strong> were unpaid volunteers. Most of <strong>the</strong>m had<br />

family responsibilities. Normally all captured heavy weapons and<br />

l/5th of <strong>the</strong> spoils went to <strong>the</strong> commander. The o<strong>the</strong>r 4/5ths was divided<br />

among <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> combatants. Many <strong>Mujahideen</strong> would take

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!