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Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

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Page 72 The O<strong>the</strong>r Side of <strong>the</strong> Mounta<strong>in</strong>: <strong>Mujahideen</strong> <strong>Tactics</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Soviet</strong>-<strong>Afghan</strong> <strong>War</strong><br />

were forced to withdraw. We withdrew to our base <strong>in</strong> Ghorband by<br />

<strong>the</strong> same route we came. We had no casualties.<br />

COMMENTARY: The <strong>Soviet</strong>s employed millions of m<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> <strong>Afghan</strong>istan<br />

for <strong>in</strong>stallation security, LOC security and area denial. M<strong>in</strong>e clear<strong>in</strong>g<br />

was a major problem for any <strong>Mujahideen</strong> attack on a prepared site and<br />

often prevented <strong>Mujahideen</strong> success. The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> needed rugged,<br />

light-weight m<strong>in</strong>e detection and clear<strong>in</strong>g gear which would allow <strong>the</strong>m<br />

to clear m<strong>in</strong>es quickly under fire. Often <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> had to resort<br />

to heav<strong>in</strong>g large rocks to create a path through a m<strong>in</strong>efield.<br />

Attack<strong>in</strong>g parked vehicles is certa<strong>in</strong>ly easier than attack<strong>in</strong>g vehicles<br />

which are crewed and mov<strong>in</strong>g. Apparently <strong>the</strong> <strong>Soviet</strong>s had not<br />

bo<strong>the</strong>red to create a sandbag wall around <strong>the</strong>ir tanks, although an<br />

RPG can penetrate <strong>the</strong> turret armor of older tanks.<br />

The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> chose a target flanked by two o<strong>the</strong>r outposts that<br />

could br<strong>in</strong>g fire onto <strong>the</strong>ir attack<strong>in</strong>g flanks. The flank security elements<br />

were close-<strong>in</strong> elements that merely guarded <strong>the</strong> flanks and did<br />

noth<strong>in</strong>g to p<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> outposts <strong>in</strong> position. The bridge outpost should have<br />

been an easier target with a better chance of success. This attack also<br />

could have employed a larger force <strong>in</strong> two phases. The first phase<br />

would be an attack to <strong>the</strong> flanks to neutralize <strong>the</strong> flank<strong>in</strong>g fire. The<br />

second phase would <strong>the</strong>n be an attack on <strong>the</strong> Totumdara post. Such an<br />

attack would require better coord<strong>in</strong>ation and discipl<strong>in</strong>e than demonstrated.

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