Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Page 46 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
posts. We began to steadily improve field fortifications areas around
Kandahar. We dug trenches with overhead cover overlooking the
enemy security posts. We constructed bunkers, underground night
shelters and covered access trenches, and stocked ammunition and
supplies in these prepared positions. Wherever possible, we built overhead
cover using timbers covered with a thick layer of dirt as protection
against artillery and aviation. We prepared firing positions for
our multi-barrelled rocket launchers. Each of these positions had a
pool of water so that the firing crew could splash water on the site
before firing to absorb the flames and fumes from the rocket launch.
These positions significantly enhanced Mujahideen field sustainability
and enabled them to fire on the enemy outposts around
the clock. Enemy attempts to dislodge the Mujahideen with air
strikes and artillery fire repeatedly failed. Enemy tanks and motorized
rifle forces were also unable to penetrate the green zones to
eliminate the positions.
Finally the enemy was forced to abandon his posts at Pasab and
Hauz-e Madad and shift his forces to Karez Slim. A local Mujahideen
commander, Mulla Nek Mohammad, and some others intensified
their daily harassment of enemy movements in the area close to
the green zone. Every morning, the Soviets would deploy security
patrols from their base at Kandahar Silo to secure the highway
from the city to Sanjari area. The Karez Slim fire base covered the
area west of Sanjari.
As Mujahideen attacks further threatened the security of the
enemy convoys on the highway, the Soviets decided to avoid the stretch
of road they could not control. They constructed a detour road to the
north of the highway. The bypass road was built in 1985 and connected
Sanjari and Karez Slim (See MaplOa - Deh-Khwaja 1 in Vignette 9).
COMMENTARY: Soviet lack of adequate reconnaissance cost them
dearly. Moving a convoy of supply vehicles in close terrain, without
effective security arrangements, often resulted in major tactical
setbacks. They further failed to cover the convoy movement with
helicopter reconnaissance and helicopter gunships. The Mujahideen
had calculated the reaction time for helicopter gunships from
Kandahar air base. Timely action by helicopter gunships could have
saved the day for the Soviet convoy, but they were apparently not
planned for and not on call.
Normally, the Soviets spaced APCs throughout the convoy as security
vehicles. In case of ambush, the APCs would stop in the kill zone