Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 11, Vignette 9 Page 315
wounded," we would tell them. They would refuse.
Except for the Ta'bils offensive and ambushes, we were defending.
The Soviets were there in strength, but they stayed on the plain with
their tanks and artillery and seldom committed their own infantry.
Their tanks and artillery blackened the plain. It seemed that they
must have had a thousand of them, but they just stayed there. The
DRA infantry was doing most of the attacking and dying. The fight
bled the DRA to the point where they could not take any more casualties.
Finally, after 34 days of fighting, the enemy forces broke contact
at 1100 hours and withdrew. In the past, the enemy had tried to take
us, but never had he come in such force or stayed for so long.
We lost up to 60 Mujahideen and commanders KIA in the base and
many others in areas around the base. DRA and Soviet casualties are
unknown, but we were always catching the enemy in surprise attacks,
so his casualties must have been much higher than ours. DRA casualties
were definitely higher than Soviet casualties. I feel that the
enemy finally quit due to his casualties. 12
COMMENTARY: The Soviets used the conscript DRA infantry extensively
and supported them with artillery and air power. The DRA infantry
was poorly trained and equipped and had serious morale problems.
The use of DRA forces as "throw-away" infantry did nothing to increase
morale. DRA forces had a reputation for passivity on the battlefield
and deserting at the first opportunity.
The Mujahideen defenses were relatively weak from the Jelawor
direction, but the Soviets apparently did not push hard enough on this
axis to discover this. Soviet and DRA tactical intelligence efforts
appear inadequate.
The Soviet/DRA willingness to drag combat out for 34 days and
then break contact and withdraw is remarkable. Their refusal to
push for quicker resolution strengthened the Mujahideen hand and
gradually created a qualitative change in the situation to the
Mujahideen advantage. On the other hand, the fragmented nature of
the Mujahideen resistance meant that the Mujahideen in
1
^ Page 6, Afghanistan Report #40, July 1987, published by the Crisis & Conflict Analysis
Team of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, Pakistan: "It was reported that over
a period of one and a half month (sic) ending June, 1987, the Soviet-Kabul troops had suffered
about 250 soldiers killed and 800 injured in Qandahar city and its suburbs. They lost
more than 100 vehicles, tanks, and jeeps, besides 13 aircraft/helicopters. About 2,500
Afghan government soldiers joined the Mujahideen during this what seemed to be the
longest Soviet-Kabul operation against the Mujahideen for several years. The offensive
apparently spilled over into July 1987."