Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Page 186 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
was an expensive option. It required four separate deployments of
forces, four separate plans of operation, three relief operations as
one faction took over the task from another and four withdrawals.
This inevitably entailed tactical and logistic duplications, unnecessary
transportation costs, and the tactical complications involved
with relieving one group by another over a wide front. Dividing the
area into four sectors, each the responsibility of one faction for a
period of eight weeks, would have achieved the same goal with
fewer complications, lower costs, better logistic support, and more
focused action. However, the lack of a unified political and military
leadership and factional differences among the Mujahideen
prevented this option.
The combined command and staff of the Mujahideen force showed
a high level of professionalism and operational vision in both planning
and execution. The movement of a large force from widely
dispersed bases to the area of operation and providing for its logistic
support using very limited local resources is an extremely challenging
task. The leadership of the force accomplished this with
admirable effectiveness. The impact of the operation went far beyond
the tactical and operational level, contributing to strategic and political
destabilization of the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. The
operation panicked the DRA government which committed unnecessarily-large
forces into the area and accepted heavy casualties.
But the Mujahideen also paid a political price for the operation.
The highway closure caused losses to civilian merchants who, at
this time of the year, export pomegranates from Tagao and grapes
from Kabul to Pakistan. The fresh fruit and vegetable trade is one
of the major sources of income in Afghanistan. During the first week
of November, representatives of fruit dealers appealed to the Mujahideen
to open the highway, but to no avail. In a guerrilla war, support
of the local population is too valuable to be risked by actions that hurt
local economy.
Tactically, the DRA committed several errors. Inadequate DRA
reconnaissance allowed the Mujahideen to deploy a several-thousand
man force within a short distance of DRA positions without detection
or interruption. Most of the Mujahideen movement took place at
night and employed natural cover and concealment in the mountainous
terrain. However, a more active DRA reconnaissance would have
disclose the Mujahideen secret deployment and allowed countermeasures
to interrupt the Mujahideen preparations for the operation.
DRA failure to establish and man observation posts on the higher