Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Page 158 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
were using helicopter gunships and other aircraft against us. Since
we were scattered over a wide area in small groups, Mujahideen
command and control over the battle was difficult and sporadic.
Coordination of the actions of the many resistance groups became
very difficult.
The battle in the orchards continued until 1400 hours. As they
ran out of ammunition, the various Mujahideen groups withdrew in
different directions and moved their wounded to safe areas. The
Soviets consolidated their advance through the green zone, securing
the high ground commanding the approaches to Estalef. I pulled my
men out to Shoraw, about three kilometers northeast of Estalef. The
Soviet/DRA column moved to Estalef and launched an intensive search
of homes. The soldiers looted homes, destroyed property and set fire to
the houses of suspected Mujahideen. Many people lost their livelihoods
due to their actions. The Soviets stayed three days in Estalef
and then returned to their bases. Mujahideen casualties in my group
were two KIA and 18 WIA. Most of the casualties were from Soviet air
strikes.
COMMENTARY: The large Mujahideen concentration in Estalef, close
to Soviet/DRA forces, was an extremely imprudent move. If the
Mujahideen patrol had not provided early warning, the Mujahideen
losses at Estalef might have been much higher. The Mujahideen
deserve high marks for their quick reaction and rapid deployment
along the road to Estalef. They utilized their familiarity with their
home area to quickly select effective fighting positions and they used
local terrain and vegetation to conceal themselves from Soviet ground
and air power. However, the Mujahideen suffered from lack of effective
command and control which prevented the timely coordination of
counterattacks and countermeasures. Better command and control
might have enabled the Mujahideen to hold the high ground dominating
the Estalef approach and to prevent the Soviet entry. But the
well-armed and supported Soviet force was able to push its way
through. The Mujahideen were reluctant to become decisively
engaged in a protracted battle with a much-stronger, better-supplied
opponent. They felt that they had to survive to face this opponent
over and over again. The Mujahideen lack of a structured, viable
supply system hampered their tactical capabilities significantly.
The Soviets and DRA deserve high marks for carrying enough
forces for dismounted combat and for using them aggressively. The
combination of overwhelming firepower and ground maneuver