Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders
Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders
Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders
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Page 124 The O<strong>the</strong>r Side of <strong>the</strong> Mounta<strong>in</strong>; <strong>Mujahideen</strong> <strong>Tactics</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Soviet</strong>-<strong>Afghan</strong> <strong>War</strong><br />
was already captured by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong>, and fled from <strong>the</strong> town.<br />
Mulla Malang's group established a secure area and signaled <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Mujahideen</strong> outside <strong>the</strong> town. Soon, hundreds of o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />
poured <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> town and cleared it from <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>ast to <strong>the</strong> northwest,<br />
end<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> bank of <strong>the</strong> Arghandab River. They cleared <strong>the</strong><br />
town build<strong>in</strong>g by build<strong>in</strong>g, aga<strong>in</strong> avoid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> streets by advanc<strong>in</strong>g by<br />
knock<strong>in</strong>g holes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> walls. O<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Mujahideen</strong> immediately climbed<br />
to <strong>the</strong> rooftops and manned <strong>the</strong> abandoned positions. Only <strong>the</strong> district<br />
headquarters rema<strong>in</strong>ed under militia control. That night, <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Mujahideen</strong> consolidated <strong>the</strong>ir ga<strong>in</strong>s and captured <strong>the</strong> district headquarters<br />
<strong>the</strong> next day.<br />
The militia had suffered heavy casualties and retreated to <strong>the</strong> overwatch<strong>in</strong>g<br />
high ground of a neighbor<strong>in</strong>g hill. The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> surrounded<br />
<strong>the</strong> militia positions. The government forces <strong>the</strong>n opened<br />
negotiations with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong>—apparently to ga<strong>in</strong> time. As <strong>the</strong>y<br />
were talk<strong>in</strong>g, an armored <strong>Soviet</strong>/DRA column arrived from Kandahar.<br />
The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> withdrew <strong>in</strong>side Panjwayee.<br />
The follow<strong>in</strong>g night, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Soviet</strong> and DRA forces attacked<br />
Panjwayee and a heavy house-to-house battle ensued. The <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />
fired from <strong>the</strong> roof tops at <strong>the</strong> government forces advanc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
along <strong>the</strong> streets. Eventually, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Soviet</strong>/DRA combat power made <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Mujahideen</strong> position untenable. The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> withdrew <strong>in</strong> small<br />
groups under <strong>the</strong> cover of darkness. The regime restored <strong>the</strong> district<br />
government <strong>in</strong> Panjwayee.<br />
COMMENTARY: The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> gradually learned that overrunn<strong>in</strong>g<br />
and seiz<strong>in</strong>g control of government adm<strong>in</strong>istrative centers is easy, but<br />
reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m usually resulted <strong>in</strong> rapid <strong>Soviet</strong> or DRA retaliation.<br />
The <strong>Soviet</strong>s/DRA felt that <strong>the</strong>y had to reta<strong>in</strong> control of local government<br />
agencies and would go to great lengths and take high risks to<br />
defend local adm<strong>in</strong>istrative centers, even when <strong>the</strong>y were tightly<br />
besieged by <strong>the</strong> resistance. Control of a district center symbolized<br />
control of <strong>the</strong> district, though this was seldom <strong>the</strong> case. In some<br />
remote districts, government control was restricted to a few build<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> center of <strong>the</strong> district town. The government spared no effort to<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir presence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se remote district centers despite <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
<strong>in</strong>significant military usefulness and <strong>the</strong> high costs,<strong>in</strong> men and material,<br />
of hold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m. This policy was promoted by <strong>the</strong> political importance<br />
of ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g control, albeit nom<strong>in</strong>al, over all prov<strong>in</strong>ces,<br />
districts and subdistricts <strong>in</strong> a country which was <strong>in</strong> revolt aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong><br />
foreign-<strong>in</strong>stalled government.