Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 6, Vignette 4 Page 163
river could not be forded by vehicles and he did not try using infantry
in assault boats to cross at another point to outflank us. Probably the
number of Mujahideen who had come to the fight on both sides of
the river discouraged the enemy from risking an infantry assault
crossing at night.
On the morning of 1 November, the enemy resumed heavy
artillery fire and air attacks. At the same time, we detected enemy
activity toward the south. Around 1000 hours, the enemy facing the
bridge began to break contact. Most of their troops headed south
across the plain on the southern bank of the Panjsher river. We later
found out that the enemy built an engineer bridge across the river
near Shokhi, some 20 kilometers down stream and crossed there to
move against Nejrao and Tagao Districts. Seeing the enemy withdraw,
we left our positions and collected what the enemy had left
behind. The next day, we pushed their disabled tanks and APCs off
the bridge into the river.
COMMENTARY: The Soviet/DRA force did not lead with reconnaissance,
nor did it use forward detachments to seize potential chokepoints
before it moved. The Soviet/DRA force was evidently surprised by the
strong resistance they met. Had they detected the Mujahideen road
block in advance, they could have dealt with it more effectively than
trying to force a crossing through repeated frontal attacks.
The Soviet/DRA force had several options besides frontal attacks.
First, they could have moved DRA forces from Jabul-e Seraj and
Gulbahar in the north to attack the Mujahideen positions from the
flank and rear since these forces were already garrisoned across the
river. Second, they could have conducted an infantry assault crossing
at an unopposed site and then attacked the Mujahideen position from
the flank. Third, if speed was essential, the planners could have selected
the option it was later forced to choose after sustaining losses and
losing much time at the Abdullah-e Burj bridge.
Once delayed by a strong Mujahideen resistance, the Soviet/DRA
columns acted very slowly to try to seize the initiative. Tanks were
ineffective in forcing the bridge. The Soviet/DRA force needed to use
well-trained infantry to seize the dominant Kuh-e Top Mountain quickly.
This mountain was on their side of the river and would facilitate
forcing the bridge. By allowing the column to stall in a Mujahideen
area, the Soviet/DRA force became vulnerable to flank and rear attacks
by local Mujahideen. Quick, decisive action is key to the survival of a
stalled, surrounded force.