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Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

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Page 44 The O<strong>the</strong>r Side of <strong>the</strong> Mounta<strong>in</strong>: <strong>Mujahideen</strong> <strong>Tactics</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Soviet</strong>-<strong>Afghan</strong> <strong>War</strong><br />

brought from Sh<strong>in</strong>dand. Sh<strong>in</strong>dand was supplied with gasol<strong>in</strong>e from<br />

a <strong>Soviet</strong>-built field pipel<strong>in</strong>e.<br />

Saranwal Abdul Wali of NIFA and I coord<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />

plan. We planned to position several <strong>in</strong>terconnected ambushes,<br />

manned by small groups of <strong>Mujahideen</strong>, to surprise and take <strong>the</strong><br />

entire length of <strong>the</strong> column under simultaneous fire. This required<br />

selection of a favorable stretch of <strong>the</strong> road that could accommodate<br />

all <strong>the</strong> ambushes required to attack <strong>the</strong> entire column. We selected a<br />

stretch of nearly seven kilometers between a po<strong>in</strong>t at <strong>the</strong> end of<br />

Sanjari (<strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of Ashoqa villages) and a po<strong>in</strong>t immediately to<br />

<strong>the</strong> east of Pashmol as <strong>the</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>g zone for <strong>the</strong> enemy column. We estimated<br />

that this stretch of <strong>the</strong> highway corresponded to <strong>the</strong> length of<br />

<strong>the</strong> enemy column.<br />

We decided to divide <strong>the</strong> 250 available <strong>Mujahideen</strong> <strong>in</strong>to several<br />

groups. The groups were armed with RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers<br />

and four-to-five 82mm recoilless rifles. All ambushes were sited <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> green zone to <strong>the</strong> south of <strong>the</strong> road. Each ambush group had an<br />

assigned sector of <strong>the</strong> kill zone. All groups were <strong>in</strong>structed to open fire<br />

simultaneously as <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> column reaches <strong>the</strong> Ashoqa villages.<br />

It was expected that at that time <strong>the</strong> tail of <strong>the</strong> column would have just<br />

cleared <strong>the</strong> Pashmol villages.<br />

At that time, most of <strong>the</strong> local population still lived <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir homes<br />

along <strong>the</strong> road. Few had migrated to Pakistan s<strong>in</strong>ce no major <strong>Soviet</strong><br />

military actions had taken place <strong>the</strong>re. The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> groups com<strong>in</strong>g<br />

from Malajat (<strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn and southwestern suburbs of Kandahar)<br />

and o<strong>the</strong>r neighbor<strong>in</strong>g bases moved dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> night to <strong>the</strong>ir designated<br />

ambush sites. The ambush plan was kept secret from <strong>the</strong> local<br />

population and local <strong>Mujahideen</strong> units s<strong>in</strong>ce resistance groups based<br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ambush area were reluctant to participate, fear<strong>in</strong>g retaliation<br />

directed at <strong>the</strong>ir homes and families still liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re.<br />

The ambush groups moved <strong>in</strong>to position dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> night and<br />

deployed patrols to secure <strong>the</strong> area. As <strong>the</strong> day began and locals<br />

started mov<strong>in</strong>g around, <strong>Mujahideen</strong> patrols temporarily deta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

<strong>the</strong> villagers to ensure secrecy. The <strong>Soviet</strong> convoy reached <strong>the</strong> kill<br />

zone at 0900 hours. As <strong>in</strong>structed, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> groups opened<br />

fire simultaneously, surpris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> enemy. The column stopped and<br />

many vehicles began mov<strong>in</strong>g north onto <strong>the</strong> open pla<strong>in</strong>. The escort<strong>in</strong>g<br />

tanks and APCs fired randomly <strong>in</strong> panic from on <strong>the</strong> road<br />

without try<strong>in</strong>g to maneuver or close with <strong>the</strong> ambush sites. Enemy<br />

vehicles mov<strong>in</strong>g north off <strong>the</strong> highway soon were out of range of<br />

many of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> weapons.

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