Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Page 178 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
group—Task Force Delta—a similar mission on the eastern flank of
the operation area, i.e. eastern mouth of the Abreshmin Gorge. I gave
Task Force Delta an "on order" mission to be prepared to serve as a
strike group. I had the Reserve group (Task Force Echo) concentrate
in the Dargo area. They were prepared to act against enemy heliborne
insertions; to relieve task forces Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta; and to
launch a counter-attack if needed.
I had the rocket launcher detachment operate independently.
Their mission was to occupy firing positions in the Chakari area (about
80 kilometers away)and hit the Kabul airport to divert attention from
the rest of the operation.
Conduct of the Operation
During the late part of September and first three weeks of October
1988, I directed the preparation, resupply and movement of participating
Mujahideen forces as they moved to the area of operation and
deployed for action. I moved a total of 400 tons of various supplies
from Pakistan to the area of operation by mules and other pack animals.
Supplies included mines, small arms ammunition, rockets, mortar
rounds and anti-tank ammunition.
One major challenge facing me was to covertly move the various
Mujahideen groups from widely dispersed locations to the deployment
area, avoiding enemy observation and air attack. Further, moving
ammunition, supplies and men from Pakistan through the three
provinces of Paktia, Logar and Kabul required detailed planning and
careful execution.
Mujahideen were all unpaid volunteers who joined the jihad to
fight. One leadership challenge was to convince guerrillas to perform
the vital, if unglamourous, missions of rear area security and LOC
security instead of participating in actual combat. This was always
hard since these volunteers wanted to fight.
Another leadership challenge was commanding and controlling
a volunteer multi-regional force and integrating them into a single
command. In fact, as later transpired, the right flank strike groups
(task forces Falcon and Hurricane) left their positions and withdrew
unannounced to their permanent bases when their permanent bases
came under enemy threat. Further, as our operation continued over a
week many Mujahideen became restless and gradually left the battle
area unannounced. Mujahideen had developed the habit of what Ali
Jalali terms "short hit and long run tactics."