Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 179
There were several reasons for this. First, the Mujahideen felt that
they were fighting a war of "a thousand battles" and no single battle
was a decisive one. Therefore, the Mujahideen felt that combat should
be limited in terms of time and space in order to increase the
Mujahideen's survivability.
Another reason was the absence of an efficient logistic system to
provide meals, medical support and other required services. The fighters
were issued all available supplies prior to the battle. There was
seldom resupply available afterwards. This forced the Mujahideen to
carry heavy loads and forage for food. Local food resources were scarce
since the Soviets had destroyed the local economy and driven out the
population in the rural areas. Consequently, Mujahideen field rations
had to be carried from Pakistan and were poor and monotonous (usually
bread with tea or boiled rice and dhal (a split chick pea dish).
Mujahideen fought best on their home territory. This area of operation
was not the "home turf for most of my forces. They were not
fighting on their home territory but away from their villages where
they were better provided for and had a better chance for rest. Given
the traditional attachment of the Afghan resistance to its home territory,
many Mujahideen did not feel the same enthusiasm they showed
in fighting their own villages.
Finally, the long treks in the mountains sometimes lasted for
weeks and contributed to fatigue before the battle began.
Mujahideen commanders were hard pressed to keep their extremely
hungry and tired fighters together for an extended period of time.
Although my operations plan encompassed a wide front from
Sarobi to Surkhakan Bridge (70 kilometers), the main action took
place on a four-kilometer stretch between Debili and Dargo bases
(Map 6-7b - Arrow 2). Combat at other points was either in support
of this action (task forces Alpha, Delta and Echo), or were separate
actions (such as attacks on Khairokhel Post, Spina Thana Base and
Kaftarkhana Base).
The operation began with rocket attacks on the Kabul military
airport on October 19. The rocket launcher detachment targeted the
airfield and kept it under intermittent fire until a few days after
the beginning of the road block when the rocket detachment
moved to Jagdalay to fire on an enemy concentration in the Nghlu-
Sarobi area.
My operations plan had four phases:
1. Attack to destroy and seize enemy bases and outposts.