Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 11, Vignette 3 Page 279
get through the mines. This slowed the enemy, but we also took
losses from their aerial bombardment. We held on and managed to
stop the enemy advance. The enemy evacuated their damaged tanks
and armored vehicles.
After one week of fighting, the enemy reinforced his effort. Some
of the Mujahideen had left since the enemy was stopped and
they had to take care of their families. The enemy employed air
assault forces, which they landed on the Tobagi plain and at
Chinosar at the eastern mouth to our canyon. They had outflanked
us. Now the enemy renewed his offensive with an attack against
the western and eastern mouths of the canyon and over the Spin
Ghar mountain. We could not hold and withdrew from our western
positions on Spin Ghar and Lakay Ghar mountains. We torched the
trucks that we had captured to prevent their recapture. The enemy
reached our canyon village of Durow and found the burnt-out hulks.
We moved east into the mountains and harrassed the enemy with
mortar fire, but they now controlled our base camps. They destroyed
what they could and left. As they left, they scattered mines in
some areas.
COMMENTARY: By 1983, the Soviets were using their air assault
forces more aggressively, but still not landing them directly on the
objective. In this case, Soviet air assault forces landed on Tobagi
plain and then climbed to the top of Spin Ghar mountain. By 1986,
Soviet air assault forces would be landing directly on the objectives.
The Mujahideen were tied to their bases and had to defend them.
This logistic imperative provided some advantages to the DRA and
Soviets, who knew that the one way to get the Mujahideen to stay in
an area where they could concentrate air power and artillery against
them was to locate the Mujahideen logistics base and attack it. Still,
the Soviets and DRA seldom did anything to "close the back door" to
the base while they attacked it. Consequently, many Mujahideen
lived to fight another day. Long range reconnaissance patrols,
scatterable mines, helicopter-landed ambush forces and conventional
forces in backstop positions are ways to prevent the escape of
. guerrilla forces.
The Mujahideen appear to have done little to improve their
defenses since this same base camp was almost overrun in June of
1980. The DRA and Soviets knew where this base camp was and how
it was defended, yet the Mujahideen established no eastern defenses.
The Mujahideen's one improvement appears to be mining the