Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 11, Vignette 14 Page 339
They took few precautions and were not aggressive in contesting
the Soviet advance. The Mujahideen showed a lack of command
and control—reflecting the absence of their leader and a working
chain of command. Further, the commander had not trained his
mortar crews in engaging moving targets.
CHAPTER COMMENTARY
The Mujahideen safe-havens in Pakistan and Iran were absolutely
essential for the survival of their force. Pakistan was particularly
important since most of the external aid came through Pakistan.
These safe havens allowed the Mujahideen a place to shelter their
families, resupply, treat their wounded, train, sell war booty to
support their families, rest and exchange tactical information and
intelligence. Pakistan provided forward supply depots near the
border and the Mujahideen built most of their major supply depots
near the Pakistan border. These Mujahideen major supply depots
were a constant target of the Soviets and DRA. In some areas, the
Mujahideen developed forward supply depots and tried to move
most of the supplies forward. In contested areas, the Mujahideen
moved their forward supply depots about to avoid capture. The major
supply depots, however, were stationary and vulnerable. A dictum of
guerrilla warfare is that the guerrilla should not hold ground.
Mujahideen logistics forced the Mujahideen to hold ground.
Mujahideen defenses were built around heavy crew-served
weapons. The popular image of the guerrilla is a small force carrying
an assortment of small arms. Most insurgencies start that way, but
successful insurgencies need heavy weapons. The problem with
heavy weapons is that they and their ammunition are hard to transport.
The Mujahideen became very adept at field fortifications and
developed shelters which protected them from intense air and
artillery attack. On the other hand, throughout the war, the
Mujahideen had difficulty fighting air and artillery systems and had
to learn how to survive them—particularly when defending. The
introduction of the Stinger man-portable air defense missile in 1986
provided upgraded Mujahideen air defense and forced the Soviets to
change their aerial tactics to avoid losing aircraft.
Soviet assaults on Mujahideen defenses were initially hampered
by their reluctance to fight at night, their over-reliance on firepower
at the expense of maneuver, and their reluctance to operate far from
their armored vehicles. As the war progressed, the Soviets developed