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Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

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Page 88 The O<strong>the</strong>r Side of <strong>the</strong> Mounta<strong>in</strong>: <strong>Mujahideen</strong> <strong>Tactics</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Soviet</strong>-<strong>Afghan</strong> <strong>War</strong><br />

COMMENTARY: Throughout <strong>the</strong> war, <strong>Soviet</strong> and DRA forces were reluctant<br />

to respond aggressively to <strong>Mujahideen</strong> night attacks. Unless <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Soviet</strong> and DRA forces had planned and rehearsed a counter-attack<br />

drill, <strong>the</strong>y rarely left <strong>the</strong> relative safety of <strong>the</strong>ir prepared positions to<br />

deal with <strong>Mujahideen</strong> night attacks. This encouraged <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />

to harass <strong>the</strong> enemy cont<strong>in</strong>uously at night and to attack <strong>the</strong> weakest<br />

po<strong>in</strong>ts of <strong>the</strong>ir defenses. Often, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> boldly attacked areas<br />

adjacent to large forces. These security posts were out of support<strong>in</strong>g<br />

range of o<strong>the</strong>r posts, so <strong>the</strong> DRA refusal to react to <strong>the</strong> attack practically<br />

handed <strong>the</strong> outpost to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong>.<br />

However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> could not fully exploit <strong>the</strong>ir enemy's<br />

reluctance to fight at night to achieve decisive tactical results. The<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> could not readily penetrate <strong>the</strong> heavily-m<strong>in</strong>ed zones<br />

surround<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Soviet</strong> and DRA positions. As long as <strong>the</strong> <strong>Soviet</strong>/DRA<br />

forces felt no serious threat from isolated <strong>Mujahideen</strong> night attacks,<br />

<strong>the</strong>y preferred to respond by artillery fire <strong>in</strong>stead of risk<strong>in</strong>g stumbl<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong>to an ambush. The <strong>Soviet</strong> and DRA response came <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of<br />

well-planned major cordon and search operations <strong>in</strong> those areas where<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> had ga<strong>in</strong>ed an upper hand.

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