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Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

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CHAPTER 11<br />

DEFENDING BASE CAMPS<br />

Although guerrilla forces would like to reta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative and<br />

never have to defend, <strong>the</strong>re are times when <strong>the</strong> guerrilla force must<br />

defend. The guerrilla can conduct a mobile defense or a positional<br />

defense. Guerrilla mobile defenses are usually rear-guard actions<br />

designed to preserve <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> force or draw <strong>the</strong> attacker <strong>in</strong>to a<br />

prepared ambush. Guerrilla positional defenses are normally associated<br />

with <strong>the</strong> defense of a pass, bridge, populated area, base camp or<br />

supply depot. The odds are stacked aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> defend<strong>in</strong>g guerrilla.<br />

The attacker has <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative, armored vehicles, air power, <strong>the</strong><br />

preponderance of artillery and overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g firepower. The guerrilla<br />

tries to match this through use of terra<strong>in</strong> and prepared defenses.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> <strong>Soviet</strong>-<strong>Afghan</strong> war, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> spent a great deal of<br />

time and energy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> defense. <strong>Mujahideen</strong> defense was associated<br />

with <strong>Mujahideen</strong> logistics. Early <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> war, <strong>Mujahideen</strong> logistics<br />

requirements were primarily concerned with ammunition resupply<br />

and medical evacuation of <strong>the</strong> wounded. The rural population will<strong>in</strong>gly<br />

provided food and shelter to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong>, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> were mostly local residents. The <strong>Soviet</strong>s decided to attack<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> logistics by forc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rural population off of <strong>the</strong>ir farms<br />

<strong>in</strong>to refugee camps <strong>in</strong> Pakistan and Iran or <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> cities of<br />

<strong>Afghan</strong>istan. They did this by bomb<strong>in</strong>g and attack<strong>in</strong>g villages, scatter<strong>in</strong>g<br />

m<strong>in</strong>es across <strong>the</strong> countryside, destroy<strong>in</strong>g crops, kill<strong>in</strong>g livestock,<br />

poison<strong>in</strong>g wells and destroy<strong>in</strong>g irrigation systems. The<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong>, accustomed to liv<strong>in</strong>g off <strong>the</strong> good will of <strong>the</strong> rural population,<br />

were now forced to transport rations as well as ammunition<br />

from Pakistan and Iran <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Afghan</strong>istan. The <strong>Mujahideen</strong> created a<br />

series of supply depots and forward supply po<strong>in</strong>ts to provision <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

forces. These depots and supply po<strong>in</strong>ts had to be defended. The<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> also controlled key passes, which forced <strong>the</strong> <strong>Soviet</strong>s and<br />

DRA to ei<strong>the</strong>r withdraw cut-off forces or resupply <strong>the</strong>m by air. The<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> defended <strong>the</strong>se key passes zealously.

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