Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

COMMENTARY: The confident commander's meal with the village elders
certainly helped his reconnaissance, but clearly tipped off the defending
DRA commander that the Mujahideen attack might come soon. On
the other hand, the Mujahideen had been in the area for some time.
Further, the guerrilla commander apparently assumed that all the
local inhabitants were favorably disposed to the Mujahideen. His
brash behavior succeeded this time, but could have compromised operational
security. Apparently, the DRA commander took no action to
increase his defenses and may not have even informed his superior.
Apparently, the Mujahideen lacked enough working radios so that
each Task Force Commander could have one. General Wardak could
not rapidly influence the course of the battle since communications
were scarce. Further, General Wardak lacked radio communications
with his eastern flank. This seems a serious problem in case the DRA
decided to roll up his operation from that flank.
Once the Mujahideen withdrew to the hills, their long-range fires
had little apparent effect. Their early departure, however, did create
additional problems for General Wardak.