Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 15 Page 401
Disunity of Command
The Mujahideen were nominally divided into seven main factions,
but the disunity was much greater. There were factions within the
factions. Old disputes and disagreements were not always put aside
for the duration of the war. There were frequent armed clashes
between Mujahideen of different factions. The reputation of certain
factions was that they were more interested in fighting other
Mujahideen than Soviets. Still, the ISI struggled to coordinate the
actions of the various factions into some comprehensive plan. In
some combat zones, such as Kandahar, the Mujahideen of different
factions cooperated readily despite the politics of their factions.
In the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were
controlled by a strict chain of command in a clear hierarchy. This was
considered a strength of the communist forces and the United States
spent a lot of effort trying to find and decapitate the central leadership.
The Mujahideen structure would be difficult to fit into a lineand-block
chart and there was never a central leadership that was
critical to the cause. Yet this inefficient disunity may have been a
strength of the Mujahideen. No matter which commanders or leaders
were killed, the Mujahideen effort would continue and the Soviets
would never be short of enemies.
On the tactical level, the Mujahideen were prepared for a long
war. Their goal was to hit, survive and fight again. Thus, the
Mujahideen could not exploit success. After a victory, they went
home. Group leaders, let alone loose coalitions, could not hold a force
together for long after a fight. As was earlier noted by the British
fighting the hill tribes, the mountain warriors could not stay together
in victory or defeat. Thus, tactical victory could not be converted
into operational gain.
Role of Military Professionals
Not more than 15% of the Mujahideen tactical leaders were
professional military officers. However, the Afghan military officer
corps played a major role in stalemating or defeating the Soviet
invasion. The most important role of the Afghan military officers who
stayed in uniform was their lack of cooperation with the government
and their subversion directed against the communist regime and
its Soviet backers. In 1978 and 1979, Afghan military officers staged
numerous, spontaneous uprisings against the regime in Herat,
Paktia, Asmar, Bala-hessar (in Kabul) and many others sites. Many
Afghan military officers passed information to the Mujahideen. In