Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 2, Vignette 10 Page 103
chain of command. Landing on a sleeping soldier was bad luck, but dry
rehearsals would have exercised the option of an approach being discovered
and provided for the continuation of the attack while wounded
are being evacuated. Since the force commander did not have communication
with his RPG gunner, he needed the firm, positive control that
a subordinate leader, located with the RPG gunner, could have provided.
Lack of communication, subordinate leadership and fire coordination
at the objective cost the Mujahideen a tactical victory.
CHAPTER COMMENTARY
The Mujahideen raid depended on surprise and quick execution.
Raids produced needed weapons, ammunition and equipment. They
also proved a good way to destroy DRA or Soviet security posts and
sites. A well-organized raid had an assault force, a fire support group
and a security element. Portable radios were needed to coordinate the
raiding elements, but all too often the Mujahideen lacked these radios.
The Mujahideen primary obstacle in a raid was to get past the mine
fields which the Soviets and DRA emplaced around their security posts
and sites. The Mujahideen launched most of their raids at night. They
did so to prevent being hit by effective air or artillery strikes and to
avoid further contact with DRA or Soviet forces which were reluctant
to leave their garrisons at night.