Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 181
2. Block the road by destroying bridges, laying mines and shelling
enemy columns attempting to reopen the highway.
3. When the enemy manages to reopen the highway, conduct a largescale
ambush to inflict heavy losses.
4. Break contact and withdraw.
PHASE ONE
The strike groups initiated their attack along the extended
front at 1000 hours, October 23. Rocket launchers, mortars, recoilless
rifles and heavy machine guns provided supporting fire from the
southern high ground overlooking the highway. Since the area was
heavily mined by the enemy, my Mujahideen could not descend on
the road from all points. Instead, they moved down a limited number
of mountain arroyos. These arroyos were safe since minefields could
not be maintained in them due to the periodic flash floods which
swept through them. These arroyos were mostly in the Debili and
Dargo area.
Once my Mujahideen passed through the mined area, they fanned
out and attacked the enemy using the paved road as the main
approach. Their movement was covered by fire from the high ground
dominating the gorge. The assault groups stormed the targeted
enemy outposts and bases. After fierce fighting, several posts were
overrun and others isolated from their bases and neighboring posts
by 1600 hours.
During subsequent attacks through October 25, my force seized
14 outposts and four bases. The occupants were killed, fled or
captured. We seized about 100 prisoners, 11 tanks or APCs and 21
other vehicles. We damaged the hydroelectric installations at Sarobi
and Nghlu which supply electricity to Kabul and Jalalabad. Our losses
were 10 killed and 21 wounded.
Phase Two
As my strike groups secured the highway, they destroyed
three highway bridges—Khairokhel bridge, Istehkam (Dargo) bridge
and Debili bridge; mined the road; set up road blocks and established
firing positions on the southern high ground overlooking
the highway, the roadblocks and the destroyed bridges. Four other
outposts and the remaining bases, except the Mash ala base, fell to
us by October 31.
The DRA's reaction was slow and incremental. The DRA now
lacked sufficient observation and security posts on the high ground