Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Bennett Park Raiders

Chapter 1, Vignette 10 Page 41
down on the lower ground where we continued to shoot them with
our anti-tank weapons.
Later in the day, the enemy brought reinforcements to the battlefield
and began to pound Mujahideen positions with artillery and air
strikes. We began to gradually withdraw our ambush force and by
1500, there were no Mujahideen left in the area. A major Mujahideen
commander, Ghulam Sakhi, and several other Mujahideen were killed
and many were wounded. We damaged or destroyed 33 armored vehicles
and 27 trucks. We captured some 40 weapons of different types.
COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen showed good planning and discipline
in this ambush, but used prepared positions that they had used before.
They also knew that these positions had exposed flanks, but took no
precautions. They felt that the Soviets would not dismount to check
the known ambush sites and did not expect immediate Soviet counteractions
to turn their flanks. They were right. The Mujahideen were
setting a pattern, but the Soviets failed to react to it. The Mujahideen
stocked their positions with sufficient ammunition for a fight of several
hours duration. They apparently took many of their casualties from
artillery and air strikes while moving to the burning vehicles to loot or
when pulling back.
The Soviet convoy movement was no secret. The Mujahideen had
contacts within the DRA and agents near the assembly areas. The
Soviets usually left after first light and therefore arrived in the area
between 0830 and 0930. This made it convenient for the Mujahideen
who did not have to stay in position all day. The Soviets knew that this
was an ambush site, but did not destroy the ambush positions, put
security elements on the high ground with helicopters or put a dismounted
force through the area to check for ambushes. Further, they
did not have helicopter gunships flying overhead or on strip alert.
They did not carry an immediate reaction force which could get up into
the mountains and turn the flanks of the ambush sites. Instead, they
relied on the combat power of their armored vehicles and slow-reacting
artillery and air support.
The Mujahideen commander had 60 combatants spread over a five
kilometers stretch of ambush on both sides of the road. He did not
have radio communications with all his people. Instead, the signal to
initiate fire was the commander firing the first shot. Other commands
were given by messenger or visual signals—mirrors, flares, smoke
grenades and waving. Command and control depended greatly on the
commander's pre-ambush briefing and SOP actions.