The dissemination of divination in roman republican times

The problem with these historical explanations is that in so far as they explain anything,
they are merely correlational. They take two co-occurring events, e.g. the introduction of
Greek philosophy (A) and disbelief in divination (B) 98 , and consider this an explanation. If
you want to explain a correlation between A (say introduction of Greek philosophy) and B
(disbelief in divination), there are four options to consider: either 1) A causes B, or 2) B
causes A, or 3) some other factor, C, causes A and B, or 4)there is no causal relationship
between A and B. None have bothered to investigate these possibilities systematically. Let us
assume for a moment that there is a causal relationship between A and B. It might then be
that a decline in belief in divination made the Romans more susceptible to Greek philosophy
(relation 2), or maybe a great admiration of everything Greek (the Greeks did not use
divination to the same extent as the Romans) produced both introduction of Greek
philosophy and disbelief in divination (relation 3).
Historical explanations of the form reviewed here also lack a theory of why some historical
events have an effect on culture change and others do not. The only stipulated mechanism is
conservatism. People simply continue doing what their predecessors have done. But
sometimes they apparently change. Why did they change this time and not some other? If we
take the example of Greek philosophy, we know that there were cultural interaction between
the Romans and the Greeks already from the 6 th century or earlier BCE (Beard, North, &
Price 1998: I, 12). Why did Greek philosophy only make an impact in the 3 rd century BCE
when the Romans must have known of it for centuries? In order to use history as an
explanation of culture change or persistence, it is necessary to give an account of why some
historical events have an impact and others don't.
It could be said that contingencies are not proper explanations, but descriptions, because
they are merely based on correlation.
The formalist thesis
A large number of scholars have assumed that divination rituals are mere formalisms to
which the Romans did not attach any belief in the gods (Bouché-Leclercq, Warde-Fowler,
Bloch, Dumezil, Taylor, and Latte). First of all, it is necessary to notice the strongly
protestant bias in the focus on belief to the detriment of ritual inherent in this thesis (Durand
98 Since recent research has shown that the foremost exponent of Greek philosophy, Cicero, took divination
very seriously (Beard 1986; Guillaumont 1984; Linderski 1995: passim), there is no reason to suggest that
reading Greek philosophy created a sceptic attitude in general.
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