The dissemination of divination in roman republican times

and games of chance a secondary development. Games-of-chance are survivals from earlier
stages of evolution. The difference between primitive and modern man appears to be that the
primitive takes divination seriously (Tylor 1891: 71). For Tylor divination is lumped together
with magic. Magic, as divination, is based on the association of ideas (Tylor 1994: IV, 293;
Tylor 1891: 104). The association in thought is erroneously transferred to reality: “he
[primitive man] thus attempted to discover, to foretell, and to cause events by means of
processes which we can now see to have only ideal significance” (Tylor 1891: 104). Omens
are explained along the same lines as having a “direct symbolism” (Tylor 1891).
Thus divination is grouped with magic, distinguished by a faulty transference of ideas onto
reality. This is a trait of earlier levels of culture. The distinguishing mark between divination
and its modern survivals, games-of-chance, is the attitude taken towards it. In divination it is
thought to involve spirits who thereby communicate, whereas games-of-chance are merely
thought of as games. 8 Divination was revealed truth and games-of-chance an entertaining
pastime.
The classicist Herbert Jennings Rose (1883-1961) elaborated in 1911 somewhat on the
claim that divination is based on faulty analogies of the mind (Rose 1974). Rose thought that
divination, like magic, was a pseudo-science. What distinguishes it from proper science is not
lack of logical structure, but false induction. The premises were wrong being based on an
arbitrary relation between omen and event (Rose 1974): “The reasoning may thus be
paraphrased in our definite phraseology: Like causes produce like effects. Therefore this
occurrence, which is like that one, will produce a like result. The fallacy lies in the ambiguity
of ‘like’ and the reasoner’s inability to differentiate between those things whose likeness to
one another is real and essential and those which bear only an accidental or fanciful
resemblance to one another” (Rose 1974: 776). Thus bad induction, a lack of ability to
distinguish real from apparent likeness results in an arbitrary as opposed to a real causal
relation between sign and event. This explains why divination systems can appear logical.
Most interestingly Rose has an explanation for why people do not realize that it is an
arbitrary relation between sign and event: “Divination rests in very ancient and wide-spread
convictions, inherited from lower levels of culture; and its great stronghold is an utter
inability to appreciate a negative argument” (Rose 1974: 775), further he writes that the
8 Tylor knew that also primitives had games of chance. He explained this as an example of a middle stage
(Tylor 1891: 73).
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