The dissemination of divination in roman republican times

The first point is the causal nexus of the argument explaining the existence of any given
evolved cognitive function. Usually evolutionary psychology is manipulating B in
psychological experiments to infer properties of F. Thus a difference in cognitive function is
inferred from differences in behavior. Tooby & Cosmides for example found that subjects
performed differently in the “Wason selection task”, when the problem was framed as a
social problem instead of a logical problem (Cosmides & Tooby 2005: 597).
The second point naturally only goes for neural structures causing behaviors specific to
humans. Behaviors related to religion are by most accounts such. Behaviors we share with
animals would not include this clause.
The third point is trickier. It amounts to distinguishing homology from analogy. It is
possible that two apparently identical behaviors have different neural substructures, in which
case they are analogous. This is the case for example of ritualized behavior, which is similar
to obsessive ompulaory disorder and normal routine behavior. While routine behavior is
analogous to ritualized behavior, obsessive ompulaory disorder seems to be homologous
(Boyer & Lienard 2006: 606). When they are analogical features, they need two different
explanations. The evoulutionary psychology account has to make sure that the behaviors are
homological or must assume that they are. An example is doing the “Wason selection task” in
terms of a social problem, must be homological, or assumed to be homological, with actual
social problem solving tasks in real life.
While a number of scholars have used some sort of hyperactive agency detection I will
focus on only two examples namely Scott Atran & Ara Norenzayan and Justin L. Barrett. Let
me just shortly mention those left out: The anthropologist Stewart Guthrie’s account is the
first, but he does not think of agency detection as primarily a cognitive function, but rather as
a perceptual function (Guthrie 1980; Guthrie 2004; Guthrie 1993; Guthrie 2001). Pascal
Boyer does not explain the function with recourse to agency detection per se, but instead with
reference to a tendency of the cognitive system to search for relevance and agentive concepts
since they can produce more inferences than non-agentive. The explanation is thus made with
recourse to a cost/benefit algorithm working as a system property of the mind, rather than to
hyperactivity (Boyer 2001; Boyer 1996). The explanation is clearly compatible with the
HADD, but does not depend on it. 55
55 I do believe that these arguments suffer from other set backs, but space does not allow me to
treat them thoroughly.
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