The Roman Army, 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook
The Roman Army, 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook
The Roman Army, 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook
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<strong>The</strong> army in the field 91<br />
reputation is greater than their achievements, since, although they have<br />
never taken anything from the <strong>Roman</strong>s and have moreover surrendered<br />
certain parts of their own territory, they have never been completely<br />
conquered, but even now are a match for us in their wars against us<br />
when they become involved in them… (<strong>The</strong>re follows a description of<br />
the Parthian army and the climatic conditions). For this reason they do<br />
not campaign anywhere during this season (winter, when the damp<br />
weather affected their bowstrings). For the rest of the year, however,<br />
they are very difficult to fight against in their own land and in any area<br />
that resembles it. For they can endure the blazing heat of the sun because<br />
of their long experience of it, and they have found many remedies for<br />
the shortage of water and the difficulty of finding it, with the result<br />
that they can easily drive away anyone who invades their land. Outside<br />
this land, beyond the Euphrates, they have now and again won some<br />
success in battles and sudden raids, but they cannot wage a continuous,<br />
long-term war with any people, both because they face completely<br />
different conditions of climate and terrain, and because they do not<br />
prepare a supply of provisions or money.<br />
This is about the only detailed, rational analysis we have of a power on the<br />
periphery of the <strong>Roman</strong> empire that might be perceived as a threat. Dio is<br />
probably expressing a late-second century view based on the accumulated<br />
wisdom of <strong>Roman</strong> experiences in the east. Note also his comments (80. 3) on<br />
the rise of the Persians, who around AD 224 replaced the Parthians as the<br />
dominant force east of the Euphrates.<br />
152 Josephus (1st C.AD), Jewish War 3. 115–26<br />
But Vespasian, eager to invade Galilee himself, marched out from<br />
Ptolemais after drawing up his army in the usual <strong>Roman</strong> marching<br />
order. (Section 116) He ordered the auxiliary lightly-armed troops and<br />
the archers to go on ahead to cut off any sudden attacks by the enemy<br />
and to investigate woodland which was suspicious because of its<br />
suitability for ambushes. Next followed a detachment of heavily-armed<br />
<strong>Roman</strong> soldiers, both infantry and cavalry. (Section 117) After them<br />
marched ten men from each century carrying their own equipment and<br />
the implements for measuring out the camp. (Section 118) Next came<br />
the engineers whose task was to straighten bends in the road, level<br />
rough areas, and cut down woodland which was blocking the way, so<br />
that the army should not be exhausted by a difficult march. (Section<br />
119) Behind these men Vespasian placed his personal equipment and<br />
that of his subordinate commanders and a strong cavalry guard to<br />
protect it. (Section 120) He himself rode behind these with infantry