The Roman Army, 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook
The Roman Army, 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook
The Roman Army, 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook
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<strong>The</strong> army in the field 99<br />
(Section 26) Because of the incredible weight of missiles we may hope<br />
that the advancing Scythians (i.e. Alani) will not get very close to our<br />
infantry formation. But if they do get close, then the first three ranks<br />
should lock their shields together, and, standing shoulder to shoulder,<br />
withstand the charge with all possible strength in the most concentrated<br />
formation, joined together in the strongest possible way. <strong>The</strong> fourth<br />
rank [shall hold up their pikes, so that they can kill any enemy horsemen,<br />
but not hold them straight up, so that the spearmen overshoot with<br />
their spears], while the first rank should wound and stab the horses<br />
and their riders ceaselessly with their pikes. (Section 27) When the<br />
enemy has been repulsed, if there is an obvious rout, the infantry<br />
formation should open up and the cavalry should advance, though not<br />
all the squadrons, only half of them. <strong>The</strong> vanguard of this formation<br />
should consist of those who are first to advance. (Section 28) <strong>The</strong> other<br />
half should follow those who have advanced first, but in good order<br />
and not in full-blooded pursuit, so that if the rout becomes complete,<br />
the first pursuit can be sustained by fresh horses, and if there is a sudden<br />
enemy counter-attack, they can be attacked as they turn. (Section 29)<br />
Simultaneously the Armenian archers should advance and shoot, to<br />
prevent the retreating forces from turning, and the light-armed spearmen<br />
should attack at the run. <strong>The</strong> infantry formation should not remain in<br />
the same spot but should advance more quickly than a walking pace,<br />
so that if any stronger resistance is encountered from the enemy it can<br />
again provide a protective screen in front of the cavalry.<br />
(Section 30) This is what should happen if the enemy are routed at<br />
the first attack. But if they wheel about and aim at an encirclement of<br />
our wings, the wings of our light-armed archers should extend their<br />
position onto the higher ground. I do not think that the enemy, noting<br />
that our wings were weaker as a result of this extension, would thrust<br />
their way through them and break up the infantry. (Section <strong>31</strong>) But if<br />
the enemy should overcome one wing or both of them, it is absolutely<br />
inevitable that their cavalry will expose their flank to us and their pikes<br />
will be at right angles to us. <strong>The</strong>n our cavalry should attack them not<br />
with a bombardment of missiles, but with swords and battleaxes. <strong>The</strong><br />
Scythians (Alani) being unprotected and with their horses unprotected<br />
(the text breaks off here).<br />
Cf. text no. 153. <strong>The</strong> text is damaged at Section 26; the restoration of Bosworth<br />
1977:240 has been translated. Arrian’s tactics give the major role to the infantry,<br />
not the cavalry, and it seems that he adapted his defensive formation from the<br />
model of the Greek phalanx in order to deal with a massed cavalry attack from<br />
the Alani; <strong>Roman</strong> commanders had tried various ways of protecting the legions