The Roman Army, 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook
The Roman Army, 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook
The Roman Army, 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook
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182 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Roman</strong> <strong>Army</strong><br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Roman</strong> emperor held his powers by virtue of a law on the<br />
vote of the people, though in practice a decree of the senate determined<br />
this. But that was a formality and the senate had no right to choose<br />
and make emperors. Nor had the army, which, along with the senate<br />
and people, was the other permanent institution in the <strong>Roman</strong> state.<br />
For the law made no mention of the emperor’s command of the army.<br />
Moreover, although the troops might be loyal to a dynasty there was<br />
no rule of dynastic succession, since at the start Augustus at least in<br />
public was not establishing a monarchy. An emperor emerged,<br />
therefore, through a number of factors—connection to the previous<br />
emperor by birth or adoption, the goodwill of senate and people, a<br />
demonstration of support by the praetorians under the direction of<br />
the influential praetorian prefects, and the acquiescence of governors<br />
and soldiers in the provinces. So, in certain circumstances the support<br />
of the praetorians or the legions could be decisive, and in a sense<br />
soldiers could informally ‘make’ an emperor. <strong>The</strong> events of AD 68/69<br />
openly demonstrated the potential importance of provincial army<br />
commanders, but the practices and ambiguities of the Augustan<br />
principate worked well, and in the next 125 years there were only<br />
two attempts (by Saturninus in AD 89 and Avidius Cassius in AD<br />
175) to follow this example.<br />
After the violent usurpation of power by Septimius Severus in AD<br />
193, in a period of just over forty years, four emperors in succession<br />
met violent deaths, three of them as a result of military rebellion. <strong>The</strong><br />
balance between the various roles that an emperor had to play had<br />
shifted. <strong>The</strong> army’s position in political life was increasingly important<br />
and also more visible; the soldiers now looked for greater financial<br />
rewards and were more insistent in opposition if they did not get<br />
what they wanted. <strong>The</strong> emperor, who had all the trappings of a<br />
commander-in-chief, was under increasing pressure to spend more<br />
time with his troops, and to show himself a good comrade and<br />
competent military leader, and indeed to assume the attitudes and<br />
demeanour of a war lord. Capacity to rule was dangerously associated<br />
with ability to control and direct an army. Maximinus, who overthrew<br />
Severus Alexander, became the first <strong>Roman</strong> emperor personally to<br />
fight in battle (Campbell 1984:365–414; the emperor as commanderin-chief—chapter<br />
3).<br />
<strong>The</strong> following extracts, set out in chronological order by the period<br />
to which they refer, are intended to illustrate some of the ways in which<br />
ancient writers thought in general terms about the army and its<br />
developing role in politics, its part in the making and removing of<br />
emperors, and the dangers of civil war.