The Roman Army, 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook

The army in the field 95
occupied the route which Tacfarinas had used to attack the town of
Lepcis, using the Garamantes as a secure base. On the other flank the
son of Blaesus commanded a detachment with the task of ensuring
that the communities around Cirta should not be attacked with
impunity. Blaesus himself, the commander-in-chief, with picked troops
took up position in the centre; he established forts and armed outposts
in strategic locations, penned the enemy in and harassed them on all
fronts, because whatever way they turned there was part of the Roman
army in front of them, on the flanks, and often in the rear. In this way
many were killed or captured. Then Blaesus split up his three formations
into smaller detachments under the command of centurions of proven
courage. When the summer was over he did not withdraw his forces or
establish them in winter quarters within the province of Africa itself,
as was the usual practice; instead he built a series of forts, as if he were
beginning the campaigning season, and then by employing lightly-armed
columns with desert experience, he continually forced Tacfarinas to
keep on the move…
In AD 17 Tacfarinas, who had been a Roman auxiliary, led a rebellion of nomad
peoples living on the fringe of the province of Africa. The war dragged on
partly because of the incompetence of some of the senatorial proconsuls and
because the Roman army found it difficult to deal with Tacfarinas’ clever tactics.
Despite the success of Blaesus, the war was not concluded until AD 24.
157 Josephus, Jewish War 2. 542–55 (extracts)
(Cestius Gallus, governor of Syria, had in AD 66 marched against the
Jewish rebels in Jerusalem, taking the Legion XII Fulminata with
detachments from the other three legions in Syria, six auxiliary infantry
cohorts and four alae, and troops supplied by friendly kings. He
subsequently decided to withdraw from the city)… On the following
day by continuing with his retreat, Cestius encouraged the enemy to
further opposition, and pressing closely round the rearguard they killed
many men; they also advanced along both sides of the road and pelted
the flanks with spears. (Section 543) The rearguard did not dare to
turn to face the men who were wounding them from behind, since they
thought that an immense throng was on their heels, and they did not
try to repel those who were attacking them in the flanks since they
themselves were heavily armed and were afraid to break up their ranks
since they saw that the Jews were lightly equipped and ready for sudden
incursions. Consequently the Romans suffered a lot of damage without